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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Recent decades have witnessed significant developments
in employment termination law in the United States.

long-standing "at-will" doctrine^

-

The

employers can fire

employees for good reason, bad reason, or even for no

reason at all

-

has experienced great erosion and wide

variations in law between the states.
There are two types of exceptions to the employment

at-will rule:

statutory exceptions and common law excep-

Statutory exceptions include federal and state

tions.

legislations specifying forbidden motivations for discharge,
such as race,

religion or national origin,^

sex,

age,"^

handicap,'^ or union activity.^

^H.

§134,

WOOD,

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT

(1877)

^Civil Rights Act of 1964,
to 2000e-17

(1982

&

Supp.

§§701-716,

42 U.S.C.

Ill 1985)

^Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,

29 U.S.C.

§§621-634

(1982

§§2000

&

Supp.

§§2-16,

Ill 1985).

^The American Disabilities Act of 1990.

^National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat.
amended; 29 U.S.C. §§151-69 (1988).
1

449

(1935),

as

.

.

Common law exceptions generally fall under one of
two categories:

either tort theory or contract theory.

The tort theories of wrongful discharge are not concerned

with the private agreement between the parties to the at
will employment contract.

Rather,

they seek to vindicate

some public policy independent of the terms of any

particular employment contract. Under the contract theories,
courts find legal protection for employees by enforcing the

private terms of their employment contract.

By 1991,

45

states had recognized at least some exceptions to the at

will doctrine,^ and one state, Montana, had enacted a

wrongful discharge act into

law."^

The movement of statutory

and common law restrictions limiting an employer's freedom
to terminate at will reflects the increasing consciousness

about the importance of job security by society and workers.
This tendency is also consistent with the developments of

other industrialized countries in the West and Japan in

which the problem of job security has been addressed with

increased frequency in the post World War II period.^
Protection of jobs is commonly important to all the
employees in the United States.

The increasing number of

^"At-Will Doctrine Under Fire," 14 Nat

page

(Oct.

1

14,

'

1

L.

J.

No6,

1991)

Code Ann. §§39-2-901 to 914 (1991)
^W. Gould IV, Job Security in the United States: Some
Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure
Legislation from a Comparative Perspective, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 2!
'Mont.

(1988)

.

.

lawsuits brought by employees, protesting their terminations as being unlawful,

represent their cry for job

An employer's right to arbitrarily discharge

security.

might be convenient for running its business without
interference.

it would

At the same time, however,

unfavorably affect the company's long-run success.
arbitrary discharge would cause
continuity,

a

The

waste of training,

and expertise and bring unfavorable effects on
loyalty, motivation,

employees' morale,

and thereby

business productivity in the long term because of the
employee's fear of being discharged.^ It is necessary to
create

a

stable work environment in which employees can

work productively without having uncertainty about their
future in the workplace.
The stable work environment,

however, does not force

employers to keep inefficient or unproductive workers but
only requires them to have

related cause of discharge.

a

clear,

legitimate,

and job-

Job security can foster

employee identification with the goals of the company,^"

Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1816, 1834-35 (1980)
See generally,
SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 166 (1972)
Time for an Unjust Dismissal
^°G. Minda & K. Raab,
Statute in New York, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1137, 1179 (1989).
("Some private corporations have recognized these
employment values and have implemented their own fair
Federal Express, Citicorp, and
employment procedures.
^See Note,

:

.

:

.

.

which would be proved by the experience of other

industrialized countries including Japan'^ and Germany. ^^
The comprehensive protection of employees outside the
unionized'-^ and public sectors^"^ is

particularly one of the

important issues to be solved because these employees

constitute

a

majority of the United States work force.

Eighty-five percent of the present American work force,
consisting of over approximately eighty-three million
workers,

are employed under the at-will doctrine.

unionized employees are discharged at

a

'°

The non-

rate two times that

International Business Machines have adopted their own
internal fair dismissal procedures.").
'^The lifetime employment in Japan is a practice, not
forced by a law or a contract.
This practice has been
widely applies and accepted by labor and management.
See
also RoDO KijuNHo (Labor Code), Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 20.
^^See Note, supra note 9, at 1836 n.l04. See also, C.
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal
Time for a Statute, 62 Va.L.Rev. 481, 511 (1976)
^^Most of the unionized workers enjoy job security
under a "just cause" provision of collective bargaining
agreements.
See generally, A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman,
Labor Law 701-02 (10th ed. 1986)
see 2 Collective
Bargaining, Negot. & Cort. (BNA) §40:1, at 121 (1986)
(grounds for discharge found in 941 of contract analyzed)
''^Public employees covered by state and federal civil
service statutes who generally cannot be fired without
As to discharge of civil
cause and without a hearing.
service workers, 15 A Am Jur 2d, Civil Service §§68 et seq.
'•'R.
Pratt, Unilateral Modification of Employment
Further Encroachments on the Employment -At -Will
Handbooks
Doctrine, 139 U.Pa.L.Rev. 197, note 1 (1990).
;

:

of unionized workers,'^ and some 1.4 million of these

workers are terminated from their job each

year.^'^

The

disparity in the right and privileges of the American work
force obviously has a significant effect on the at-will

Since it is unlikely that the complicated array

employee.

of statutory and common law exceptions to the at-will

presumption corrects the disparity in employment environments and uniformly provides all the employees with job
security,

a

comprehensive statutory approach to employment

termination would be the best solution.
This article, by consistently focusing on the problem
of job security,

contends that total abolition of at-will

employment by unjust-dismissal legislation will ultimately
be necessary for all employees to be fully protected

against wrongful discharge.
Part II of this article traces the origin of the at-

will doctrine to 19th century principles favoring economic

individualism and formalistic interpretation of contracts
and proves that there is

a

distinct difference in the

social backgrounds between the past and the present.

Part

III examines the doctrinal basis for the at-will rule in

light of modern tort and contract principles.

Part IV

reconsiders the subjects of Part II and III in relation to
job security and discusses the total abolishment of the at
'^Hames,

The Current Status of the Doctrine of

Employment -At -Will, 39 Lab. L.J. 19, 19 (1988).
17
Pratt, supra note 15, at 197 n.3.

will rule by legislative action.

Part V advocates a

federal statute requiring employers to fire employees only
for good cause.

It begins by dealing with the

Montana

Statute and Model Employment Termination Act and then
analyzes the concept of "good cause".

coverage of

a

just cause statute,

remedies and procedures.

It also examines the

including topics such as

CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE

AND HISTORICAL EXCEPTIONS

Wood's Rule

A.

The employment at-will doctrine grew out of the pre-

industrial concepts of master and servant in the 19th

century whose relations were rooted in feudalism and
family/^ where the employer took responsibility for the
servant's health and well-being.

Horace

G.

Wood articulated that

period was presumptively

a

In an 1877 treatise,
a

^^

hiring for an indefinite

hiring at will, which could be

terminated at any time by either party. ^°

This so-called

Wood's principle was first adopted by the New York court in
the Martin case^^ and then became the "American rule" of

as

a

Ga.L.Rev.
^^H.

^°Id.

Linzer,

416,

375

323,

(1986)

.

supra note

Wood,

1,

at 272-73.

at 272.

^^Martin

N.E.

The Decline of Asset:

At-Will Employment
Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 2

^^P.

418

v.

New York Life Ins. Co., 148 NY 117,

(1895)

121,

("With us the rule is inflexible,

42

that

general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof.
[I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the
will of either party, and in this respect there is no
distinction between domestic and other servants").
a

7

.

8

substantive law.
from Status,

Behind the scenes was

transition

a

"the servant," to Contract,

"the employee."

The at-will doctrine reflected the then laissez fair

economic philosophy in the 19th century.
of the era of large-scale industry,

With the coming

the attitude of

Government was undoubtedly favorable to the employer,
stressing the freedom of rhe employer to run its business

without interference and encouraging industrial growth.

By

enabling the employer to enjoy great discretion over the
employee in the employment relationship, the at-will

doctrine contributed to the entrepreneurship and economic
growth of the era.
The concept of "freedom of contract" was also evolved

from the laissez-faire economic policy.

large-scale industry was developing at

In that age when
a

rapid pace,

workers frequently changed jobs on their own initiative^^
thanks to the historic American shortage of labor.

The

policy of vesting employers with maximum freedom to terminate employees probably seemed to the courts an obvious

interpretation of "mutuality of obligations."

And so,

"freedom of contract" that the terms of the employment
relationship,

like those of other economic relationship,

should be determined entirely by the parties to the
contract without interference from state or federal

^^A.

Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment

Termination,

66N.C.L.Rev. 631, 641

(1988).

.

.

governments^ seemed to the courts an obvious translation
of public policy into the employment sphere.

B.

^'^

Movements of Statutory Protections
At the turn of the century,

there arose a movement to

call for some protections for employees.

The federal and

state governments as well as the public began trying to

correct the inequality of powers between employers and

employees

Legislatures carved out exceptions to freedom of
contract running along two distinct lines:

first, pro-

tecting collective employee rights, and second, protecting
individual employee rights.
As to the former,

social and economic pressures led to

legal developments protecting the economic welfare of

workers; collective bargaining and unionization of employees created the initial change and the erosion of the

employment at-will doctrine.
19322'^

The Norris-LaGuardia Act of

and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935^6 sought

to create an environment in which collective bargaining

would replace individual bargaining for most employees.

^^W.

Freedman,

The Employment Contract Rights and

Duties of Employers and Employees 13 (Quorum Books 1989)
^'^Leonard, supra note 22, at 641. ("Furthermore such a
rule was consistent with the general approach of the courts
toward employment issues").
^^29 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1988).
2^29 U.S.C. §§151-169 (1988).

.

10

Acting through

a

representative of their own choosing,

employees would become their own guardians^' and obtain

a

voice in many decisions affecting their working lives such
as wage rates,

benefits, working conditions,

Section 8(a)

security.

(3)^^

and job

of the NLRA prohibits an

employer from discriminating in employment in order to

encourage or discourage union membership.

The employer's

freedom to discharge employees is curtailed in this

significant respect.

Furthermore, most of the unionized

employees can enjoy protection from wrongful discharge
under a "just cause" provision of collective bargaining

agreements

.^^

The shift of American labor law in the late 1960

's

from the legislative protection of collective employee
rights to protection of the individual further eroded the

Labor Law as the Century Turns: A
Changing of the Guard, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 7, 9 ("The basic
assumption of the N.L.R.A was that the labor market would
be regulated by collective bargaining, not by legislation.
Workers would be protected by their union, not by government officials.
Workers' rights would be guaranteed by the
collective agreement, not by the law.
Those rights would
be defined and enforced through grievance procedures and
arbitration, not through administrative agencies or
courts"
^^§8 (a) (3) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiSummers,

^"^C.

)

zation.

.

.

2^See

"

)

.

note 13.

.

11

"Equal Employment Opportunities"

at-will presumption.

provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964^°
protect employees from discriminatory discharge on the
basis of race, color,

religion,

sex,

or national origin.

Other special purpose statutes prohibit discharge because
of

age'^^

Retaliatory discharges of employ-

or disability ."^^

ees exercising their statutory rights have also been

outlawed. ^^

An overview of this legislative history indicates
three general characteristics of the recognition of

employee rights.

First, working conditions, particularly

economic interests of the employee, could be encompassed in

collective agreements.

Provisions requiring just cause for

discharge seem to be by-products of collective bargaining
rather than primary interests such as wages or benefits.
The second characteristic is that interests protected

by legislation are primarily non-economic interests in

^°§703

(a)(1),

42 U.S.C.

§2000e-2.

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975 (ADEA)
In 1986, the Age Discrimi§4 (a), 29 U.S.C. §623 (a) 1982
nation in Employment Act was amended to forbid mandatory
retirement based on age, with a few narrow exceptions
pertaining to specified jobs. Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L
No. 99-592, 100 State 3342.
^^The American Disabilities Act of 1990.
^^Age

(

2^19

U.S.C. §612(d)

(1982

)

.

&

Supp.

IV 1986) (ADEA);

29

U.S.C. §158(a) (4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (NLRA) ; 29 U.S.C.
215(a) (1982 & Supp IV 1986) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. §651 (1982
Supp. IV 1986) (OSHA)

§
&

.

.

12

fairness, personal dignity, privacy,
rity.'^'^

or physical integ-

Most of the federal labor legislation falls in this

category.

Protection for substantive and procedural

fairness and justice leads to the democracy of the work

place
The interrelation of the collective employee rights

and the individual employee rights is worth discussing.

Since labor legislation regarding individual rights

generally regulates minimum standards of working conditions,
it is desirable for unions to take an important role in

order to further improve those conditions and to create

dependable environment in which both labor and management
abide by the rules with responsibility.

Labor legislation

concerning collective rights would function as

a

comple-

ment to the legislation regarding individual rights.
However, because collective bargaining has failed to take
root as the function of establishing or raising employment
conditions,"^''

played

a

statutes which regulate individual rights has

significant part in the American employment law.

The third,

and the most important,

characteristic is

that legislatures and the courts are in a formative phase
to build on an assumption that the employee has a valuable

supra note 27, at 15.
(1989) (noting
^''See 1 HoFSTRA Law.L.J. 71, at 104 n.l21
that 12.9 percent of "all private nonagricultural wage and
salary workers were members of unions .. .while 14.2 percent
(of those same workers) were represented by unions")
^''Summers,

13

interest in his job which ought not to be arbitrarily
taken

away."^^

This assumption is the very progressive

attitude toward job security for workers.

36

Summers,

supra note 21,

at 15

CHAPTER III
COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE

The history of employment law in The United States has

been the history of adding demanded and recognized employee
rights one by one.

There is no doubt that the judiciary

has made efforts to respond to the public's desire to see

fairness and justice in the workplace.

Academic criticism of the at-will doctrine, starting
generally in the 1960
public,

's"^"^

along with the felt need of the

spurred courts to extend legal theories and to

develop new remedies for at-will employees.

By the 1980

's,

the courts of the majority of the states had created some

exceptions to the at-will rule.
reflect

a

Judicial developments also

tendency of courts frequently to alter the common

law rules concerning employment,

often looking to decisions

from other states for guidance.
The common law exceptions based on

a

variety of

perceptions about the inadequacy of the at-will presumption
generally divide into two broad categories: tort and

Employment At Will vs. Individual
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Freedom:
Power, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 1404 (1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges
A necessary Change in the Law, 4 Ohio St.
from Employment
'^''See,

e.g..

Blades,

:

L.J.

1

(1979),

etc.
14

15

The tort theories of wrongful discharge are

contract.

not concerned with the private agreement between the

parties to the employment contract.

vindicate some public policies,

They rather seek to

found expressly or by

implication in statutes or common law,

independent of the

terms of any particular employment contract.

The most

common of the tort theories is the public policy exception.

Under the contract theories, courts find legal protection for employees by enforcing the private terms of their

employment contracts.

Breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing is rather a sub-category of
suits based on breach of contract.

The implied covenant

theory argues that in every contractual arrangement between
the law implies that the parties will deal fairly

parties,

and in good faith with one another regardless of whether

there is a written,

implied,

or oral agreement.

This is

consistent with other contract developments, particularly
the provisions of the "Uniform Commercial Code"'^^ and the

"Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
contract imposes

a

"'^^

duty of good faith in its performance

However, only a few states adopt this

^^U

.

C C
.

stating that "every
.

"^°

rule.'^^

.

^^RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§90, H

1

(1979).

''Id.

California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Montana, and Nevada (Table 1. Chronology of Exceptions to
the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Each of the Fifty
States), A. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal
'^'Alaska,

,

.
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A.

Tort Theories

1.

Public Policy Exception
The first exception to the employment at-will doctrine

recognized in the United States is based on notions of
public policy,

"^^

and the most widely accepted exception has

been the "public policy exception.

The basis of the

"^"^

Legislation in the United States, 44
649

Indus. & Lab.Rel.Rev.

644,

(1991)

of Teamsters , Local 396, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P. 2d. 25 (1959); Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Monge v.
BeeheRubher Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A. 2d 549 (1974); Harless
V. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Sheets v.
Int.

'^^Peterman v.

Bhd.

Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
(1980),

179 Conn.

471,

427 A. 2d 385

etc.

Seligman, At-Will Termination: Evaluating
Wrongful Discharge Actions, TRIAL, Feb. 1983, at 60,61
("The Public Policy limitation on at-will termination is
^^See,

the most widely accepted of the new wrongful discharge

See generally. Comment, Guidelines for
causes of action").
a Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Rule:
The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 Conn. L. Rev. 617 (1981); Note,
Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 Stan.
Note, Protecting Employees at Will
L.Rev. 153 (1981);
The Public Policy Exception,
Against Wrongful Discharge:
96 Harv. L.Rev. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Public
DeGiuseppe, The Recognition of Public
Policy Exception]
A
Policy Exception to the Employment -At -Will Rule.
Legislative Function? 11 Fordham Urb L J 721 (1983); Note,
Development of the Pablic Policy Exception to the At-Will
Doctrine, 29 Ariz. L.Rev. 295 (1987); Cashman et al
Employment Law: Minnesota Adopts the Public Policy
Exception to the At-Will Doctrine, 14 Wm Mitchell L.Rev. 210
(1988); but see. Note, The Price of the Public Policy
;

.

.

.

.

.

.
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exception is the duty of the employer not to fire an
employee for reasons that contravene fundamental principles
of public policy.'" Accordingly,

the courts generally

protect three categories of employee conduct:''^

refusing to engage in illegal activities;

statutory right or performing

a

(2)

(1)

exercising

civil obligation; and

a

(3)

reporting criminal conduct to supervisors or outside
agencies
In the first category of cases,

the most typical ones

are those of employees fired for refusing to give false

testimony at

a

trial or administrative hearing/^ Typical

was the leading case,

Petermann

v.

Local 396,

International

Brotherhood of Teamster s,"^"^ where an employee was fired for
refusing to perjure himself at the command of his employer.
The court held that the public's interest in preventing

perjury was sufficiently great to warrant judicial

Modification of the Terminable At-Will Rule, 34 Lab L.J.
563

(1983)

^Public Policy Exception, supra note 43, at 1936,
'^''Some commentators divide the conduct as follows:
(1)
refusing to commit an unlawful act; (2) performing an
important public obligation; and (3) exercising a statutory
right or previlege. Id.
''^The nature of the proceedings in which the employee
is asked to testify untruthfully should not affect the
cause of action, i.e., before a state legislative committee,
before a state fair-employment agency, before federal
agencies,
^'174

etc.

Cal.App.2d 184,

344 P. 2d 25

(1959).

.

intervention/^

.

A case such as discharge for refusing to

take part in price-fixing schemes, with Petermann at one
extreme,

falls into this category.''^

The rationale for protecting these employees appears
to be twofold.

First,

the courts feel it necessary that

they prohibit employers' illegal conduct in order to

protect the general welfare or the policy evidenced by
penal codes, constitutions,

and other statutes.

Second,

the courts seemingly permit a cause of action relying on
the widely accepted principle that employees should not be

required to choose between violating

a

law or becoming

unemployed. ^°
The second category includes discharges for filling

workers' compensation claims,

^^Id.

at 189,

^^E.g.,

167,

°'

refusing to take polygraph

344 P. 2d at 27.

Tamenny

610 P. 2d 1330,

Atlantic Righfield Co., 27 Cal 3d
164 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980); Haigh v.
v.

.

Matsushita Electric Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1332 (applying
Virginia Law)
'^^Winther v. DEC International, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100;
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164
Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P. 2d 1330.
'"^Kelsary v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111. 2d, 172, 384 N.E.
2d. 353 (1978); and Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666
S.W.2d. 730 (1983); but rejected in Martin v. Tapley, 360
So.

2d 708

(Ala.

1978)

.

:

.

19

tests,

or performing an important civil duty such as

jury service. ^^
Finally,

there are situations where the discharge

results from the reporting of improper or criminal

activities of employers or co-workers to superiors or
outside agencies, including the press or government; i.e.,

"whistle-blowing" cases.

^'^

The judicial approaches vary

concerning the protection for whistleblowers

The best

.

approach would be that employees discharged for reporting

statutory violations be entitled to relief because public

policy clearly favors the exposure of crime,

although no

^''

law compels an employee to step forward to communicate his

suspicions regarding illegal activity.

including

federal whistleblower legislation,

protecting all government workers,

52^ees V.

Reuther

v.

Hocks,

Fowler

386 A. 2d 119

&

272 Or.

The enactments of

^^

a

and state legislation

536 P. 2d 512

210,

statute

(1975),

Williams ^ Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28,

(1978)

generally, Malin, Protecting the Whistle Blower,
16 U.Mich. J. L.Ref. 277 (1983); D.Massengill, Whistleblowing
Protected Activity or Not?, 15 Empl.Rel. L. J. 4 9 (Summer
^'^See

1989)

;

or The Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower

The
Protection Act and the Conscientious Employee:
Potential for Federal Statutory Enforcement of the Public
Policy Exception to Employment AT Will, 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. 513
(1990)

K-Mart Corp (CA
U.S.C.S. §§2 3 02 (b) (8) and

'^Belline v.
5^5

,

7

111)

940 F.2d 184.

2 3 02 (b) (9)

.

.
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including New York laws,^^ are based on the rationale of

protecting whistleblowers

2.

Definitions of Public Policy
One of the most difficult issues presented in a public

policy case is determining what public policy is.
scope of the "public policy" exception,

limited to

a

The full

if it is not to be

state's specific legislative enactments or

even to its judicial decisions,

is a remaining question.

The most traditional sources for finding public policy are
the official documents of policy such as federal and state

constitutions and legislative enactments.^''' The Illinois
Supreme Court acknowledged in its landmark decision,

Palmatter

v.

International Harvest:^^

There is no precise definition of the
term.
In general, it can be said
that public policy is what affects
the citizens of the state collectively.
It is to be found in the state's
constitution and statutes and, when
they are silent, in its judicial

decisions

.^^

The Michigan Supreme Court in Suchodolski readily

accepted that ethical conduct was important but held that

a

private code of ethics, such as that for internal auditors.
(McKinney Supp.1988).
"Leonard, supra note 22, at 659.
•^^85 111. 2d 124,
421 N.E.2d 878.
"^N

.

Y Lab Law §740

'"^Id.

.

.

at 878.

.

.

21

did not comprise
V.

Michigan Sugar

lation of

"clear public mandate."^"

a

Co.,^^

In Schwartz

the court declared that an articu-

clear public mandate is limited to subjects

a

that have actually been treated by the public, whether by
the legislature,

state agencies, or state courts or their

federal equivalent.

A majority of the courts adopting

public policy exceptions in general hold the view that

a

clearly established public mandate must be found in statutes,

regulations or court decisions. ^^ This is "public

policy" in

a

narrow sense.

On the other hand,

courts that adopt a broad defini-

tion of "public policy" theoretically do not require the
^^Suchodolski

v.

Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 316

N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982)
^^106 Mich.App. 471,
^^See, e.g.. Turner

308 N.W.2d 710.

Letterhenry Fed. Credit Union,
505 A. 2d 259 (9a. Super. Ct. 1986) (need a clear public
mandate to overcome employment-at-will doctrine)
or
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 174 Ariz. 370,
710 P. 2d 1023 (1985) (only those statutes, constitutional
law, and judicial decisions will provide the basis for a
wrongful discharge claim).
See also, Salazar v. Furr's
1403 (1986) (The court rejected the
Inc., 629 F. Supp
plaintiff's public policy argument that her dismissal for
being married to an employee of the company's competitor
violated the public policy that encourages family unity and
The court said this
the maintenence of family discipline.
was a very broad principle but stated no specific expresThe court found that
sion of the alleged public policy.
plaintiff's asserted public policy was "too amorphous" and
therefore held that she failed to state a claim for wrongv.

;

.

ful discharge)

.

.
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policy in question to be embodied in
authority, or precedent.

a

specific statute,

The broad definition of public

policy may be found in the Cilley decision in New

Although the plaintiff cited no specific

Hampshire .^"^

statute authority or precedent as the source of his
complaint,

the Court held that he was entitled to a trial

on his complaint.

Saying that "[t]he public policy

contravened by the wrongful discharge can be based on
statutory or non-statutory policy,

"^'^

the Court opined that

what all the plaintiff must do in order to maintain an

action for wrongful discharge is to prove he was discharged

because he refused to do something public policy would
condemn or did something public policy would encourage. ^^

New Hampshire is one of the very few states that
adopts the broad definition of public policy and is, as one

might notice, one of the first states to adopt the public

policy exception. ^^

Fewer and fewer courts are willing to

New Hampshire Ball Bearings, 514 A. 2d 818
(1986) (The plaintiff claimed that he was fired for refusing
to lie to the company president to cover for a senior
official then alleged his dismissal constitute wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy)
^'^Cilley V.

^^Id.

at 820.

Court further said that a jury could find that
the plaintiff was discharged for refusing to lie and that
public policy supports truthfulness.
^^Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A. 2d 549 (NH 1974).
In Cilley, the Court cited Monge even though the sweeping
holding in Monge was subsequently narrowed in Cloutier v. A
^^The

&

P Tea Col,

436 A. 2d 549

(NH 1974)

.
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accept the broad definition for fear that "public policy" could be found anywhere under such a broad view.

Still

other courts treat the whole concept of public policy as

unsuited for judicial application in this context and
instead declare it as

a

matter to be left to the

legislature .^"^

3.

Interrelation Between the Public Policy Exception and
Job Security
It is

unlikely that the public policy exception leads

to a drastic modification of the at-will doctrine because
it probably covers only a small percentage of wrongfully

discharged employees. In light of the prevalent narrow
definition of public policy, shrewd employers who know the
public policies of the state and nation as expressed in
their constitutions,

statutes,

judicial decisions, and

administrative regulations are free from liability. The
public policy exception is not designed to provide all
employees with job security^® but rather to protect the
"public" from employers who break the law.

"The public

policy exception has nothing to do with job security.

"^^

The fact that a substantial majority of states have adopted

Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 2 93,
488 N.E.2d 86 (1983)
Common Law Remedies for Wrongfully
^^D. Kornblau,
Discharged Employees, 9 Indus .Rel. L. J. 660, 667 (1987).
^'^

''Id.
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the public policy exceptions that are relatively non-

controversial and even endorsed by some strong defenders of
the at will presumption''''' does not necessarily indicate a

progressive attitude towards job security.

B.

Contract Theories

Under contract theories, courts find legal protection
for employees by enforcing the private terms of their

employment contracts. According to the theories, the atwill presumption may be rebutted by certain employer

actions or statements, written or oral, regarding job

security or termination procedures which are legally binding contractual obligations.
In Woods'

time,

master-servant relations rooted in

feudalism were similar to relationships of the family, in

which the servant was only "a protected and restricted
creature of status.

"'^^

In the post-Wood period,

the industrial revolution

brought "a movement from Status to Contract,

"'^^

and it was

settled that the employer-employee relationship was the
product of an agreement between the parties regarding the
nature of work to be performed and terms or conditions of
employment.

As such,

^°Epstein,
U. Chi. L. Rev.

the employer-employee relationship.

In Defense of the Contract at Will,

947,

952-53

(1984)

51

.

''Id.
"^^H.

Maine, Ancient Law 165(1964) (emphasis in original

.

.
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even though terminable at will,

is

basically contractual.

Relying upon this contractual nature found especially in

written company policies and procedures, terminated
employees argued with increasing frequency that their
indefinite terms of employment are terminable only for
cause
For decades,

it has been increasingly common for

employers to promulgate company policies and rules through
the medium of employee handbooks or personnel manuals.

Employers generally regard the handbook as an effective
tool to communicate to all or specific employees about the

company's policies and practices

."^^

Such handbooks usually outline two types of formal
rules:

substantive policies governing the employee's job

and employment expectations; and procedual policies dealing

with personnel benefits.

They may contain explicit

provisions regarding personnel benefits and human resources,
or they may contain only vague statements

'^'it

is not,

prepare such

however,

.'^'^

Whatever the

always necessary for a company to

document
'^''Personnel policy has been rejected as part of the
employment contract where it was found that the policy was
nothing more than a mere general expression of goodwill and
For example, Brown v. Safeway
optimism for the future.
Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp., 295 (E.D.NY. 1960) (the company
president's statement at a meeting of district managers
that the district managers would always be employed is not
See also,
to secure life or permanent employment)
Brookfield v. Drury College, 139 Mo.App. 339, 123 S.W. 86
a

.

.

.

.
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form they may take,

employees began to assert that prom-

ises and procedures found in documents give rise to some

contractual obligations on the part of the employer.

1.

The Traditional Approach
In its literal sense,

"breach of contract" in the

employment context means the existence of
contract that has been breached.

a

formal,

written

The issue now raised more

frequently is whether documents other than formal contrcts
such as company policies are part of the employment

contract
Courts traditionally supported the view that employee

handbooks did not affect the employer's right to discharge
the employee at will.

The cases rejecting company policy

as part of the employment contract are premised upon the

absence of meeting of minds, mutuality, consideration, or
def initeness

a.

Meeting of Minds
The Supreme Court of Kansas'

National Beef Packing

Co.'^''

decision in Johnson

v.

exemplifies strict adherence to

the traditional contract requirements.

In Johnson,

a

policy manual was published and distributed after the

and Schroeder
(E.D.Mich. 1977)

(1909);

910

^^220 Kan.

52,

v.

Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448

551 P. 2d 779

(1976).

F.

Supp

.

.
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coininen cement

of the plaintiff's employment

."^^

the unilateral nature of the policy manual,

Stressing
the court wrote

as follows:

"It was only a unilateral expression of company policy

and procedures.

Its terms were not bargained for by the

parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuiCertainly, no meeting of the minds was evidenced by

ties.

the

[employer's] unilateral act of publishing company

policy.

"^^

This rationale was followed by some other jurisdictions.''^

In Darlington v.

General Electric,

'^^

the

Pennsylvania Superior Court remained faithful to the
rationale expressed in Johnson, refusing to find

based on the plaintiff's job interview and
him during the interview.

a

a

contract

manual given

The court held that the simple

fact of publishing a manual did not prove the "meeting of

the minds" necessary to the formation of a contract.

The

terms of the handbook were not bargained for, hence

unenforceable

.^°

^^Jd.

at 781.

^^Jd.

at 782.

Union Carbide Courp., 511 F. Supp. 562,
564 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (there must be a meeting of the minds
by the parties that the handbook's provisions conferred a
contractual right on the employee)
"^^2
Individual Employment Rights Cases 1666 (Pa. Super.
''^E.g.

Ct.

1986)
''Id.

Lieber

v.

.
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Mutuality of Obligation

b.

In addition to citing lack of "meeting of minds" as a

bar to employees' contract claims, some courts have said
that

a

handbook is not

a

contract because there is no

"mutuality of obligation."^'

In employee handbook cases,

courts have applied the doctrine of mutuality of obligation
that the employer is not bound to employ if the employee is

not bound to continue his employment but is free to quit
his job at any time for any reason. ^^
The view that job security provisions lack enforce-

ability because of the absence of mutuality of obligation
has been widely criticized and rejected by the courts.

^^^

Confusion has resulted most frequently from the word
"mutuality" itself, which connotes symmetry. Since the law
of contract,

however, does not require the exchange of

symmetric promises, the doctrine of mutuality of obligation
^'There are at least three discrete mutuality con-

mutuality of assent; (2) mutuality of remedy;
The doctrines have been
and (3) mutuality of obligation.
repeatedly confused by the courts. William J. Holloway &
Michael Leech, Employment Termination Rights and Remedies
cepts:

53

(1)

(2d ed.

1985)

Fairchild Industries, Inc., 413 So. 2d 800
(Fla, Dist. Ct. App.1982).
^^E.g., Pugh v. See's Candies Inc., 116 Cal App 3d 311
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille 333 N.W.2d 622
(1981);
(Minn 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458,
443 N.E.2d 441 (1982); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
^^Hamlen

v.
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cannot be sustained on the basis of symmetry.^

Mutu-

ality of obligation simply requires that both parties give

consideration "in the form of
promise.

"^^

a

valid,

legal,

and binding

accordingly, require the exchange

It does not,

of identical promises.
To summarize, mutuality appears,

merely

a

form of consideration,

consideration for
obligation,

a

therefore,

to be

and as long as some valid

contract is present, mutuality of

in the sense of requiring such reciprocity,

is

not essential. ^^

c.

The Requirement of Additional Consideration
The contract theory of consideration in employment law

is the single confusing issue.

Contract law requires that

consideration be given in exchange for the promiser's offer
in the form of a promise in order to convert that offer

into a binding agreement.

The question is what value the

employee must give in exchange for the promises of job

security contained in the handbook.

^Holloway

&

Leech,

supra note 81,

at 54.

''Id.

Mcgraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444;
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629.
See also, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d
Mutuality of obligation is disposed of in one
880,885.
sentence: "[t]he enforceability of a contract depends,
however, on consideration and not mutuality of obligation."
'^Weiner

v.

.
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Courts taking the traditional contract approach

have answered this question by stating that a promise of
job security must be supported by independent or additional

consideration, consideration other than services to be
rendered,
wages.

^^

because work is already being compensated by

This "additional consideration" doctrine appears to

be grounded upon an unstated presumption that a single,

undivided consideration may be bargained for the agreed
equivalent of only one promise. Thus, where services are
made only in consideration of wages or salary, employees
who have not given additional consideration to support

their reliance on the promises in the handbook have usually

been unsuccessful in proving

a

contract right to these

promises
The requirement of additional consideration for a

promise of job security has received increasing criticism.
One reason for judicial disapproval is that several employer promises may be enforced by a single performance by the

employee,

thus there is no requirement of

a

one-to-one

relationship of promises or equivalency of consideration.

additional consideration include:
the employee's release of a tort claim against the employer,
giving up another job, moving to take another job, forgoing
See
another job opportunity, and longevity of service.
Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 47-50.
^'Some examples of

.
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The court in Pugh

v.

See's Candies^ Inc.^^ referred

to the formalistic approach of independent consideration as

"Moreover, while it has sometimes been said that

follows:
a

promise for continued employment subject to limitation

upon the employer's power of termination must be supported
by some 'independent consideration,'

consideration

i.e.,

such a rule is

other than the services to be rendered,

contrary to the general contract principle that courts
should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.
Calamari

&

Perillo,

'A single and

Contracts

(wd ed.

§4-3,

1977)

(See

p. 136.).

undivided consideration may be bargained for

and given as the agreed equivalent of one promise or of two

promises or of many promises.'
125,

pp.

535-536.)

(1

Corbin on Contracts 1963)
(

§

Thus there is no analytical reason why

an employee's promise to render services,

or his actual

rendition of services over time, may not support an employer's promise both to pay a particular wage

and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal

(for example)

"^^
.

As the court goes on to explain, where courts view the

employment relationship as the exchange of
ple employer promises,

a

such as promises to pay

wage and to offer some kind of job security,

^^116 Cal.

App.

3d 311,

a

particular

for a single

Rptr.

917(1981),
203 Cal. App. 3d, 743,

171 Cal.

appeal after remand (1st Dist)
Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988)
''Id.

set of multi-

250

.

32

consideration by the employee, there is no need to apply
the additional consideration doctrine. ^°

Some Illinois cases illustrate the evolution of the
law of consideration but also exemplify the continuing

struggle with the idea of the requirement of additional
In Carter v.

consideration.
Agency,

^^

Kaskaskia Community Action

the employer adopted a personnel manual, which was

reviewed and accepted by the employees and approved by the
employer's board of directors,

employee began work.

four years after the

The employee contended that he was

illegally discharged because the discharge procedures set
forth in the manual were not followed.

^'^

The court held

that the manual was enforceable as part of the employment

contract, and the employee was thus illegally discharged. ^^

Carter stands for the proposition that personnel

manuals can be part of an employment contract if two
conditions are met:
contract; and

(2)

(1)

a

manual is

a

modification of the

the manual is bargained for or given

independent consideration in the form of the employee's

continuing to work after the manual takes effect.

Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 4 ("Our
research has not identified any court opinion that
attempted to explain why a promise of a pension is
enforceable but a promise of some kind of job security is
not when both are in exchange for employee services.")
^'24 111. App.3d 1056,322 N.E.2d 574
(1974).
^^322 N.E.2d at 575-76.
^°See aJso,

''Id.
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According to the court, the manual subsequently distributed was

modification of the existing "at-will employ-

a

ment" contract^'' and the employee provided independent

consideration to support the second requirement by continuing to work.
In Sargent v.

Illinois Institute of Technology, ^^ the

court held the manual was not an enforceable contract^^

because two conditions, which the Carter court addressed,
were not met.

The Sargent court said:

(1)

the personnel

manual prescribing the guidelines for the predischarge

hearing was not

a

modification of any preexisting employ-

ment contract because the plaintiff was given the manual

when he commenced work; and

(2)

the terms set forth in the

manual were not bargained for and the employee provided no

independent consideration for the predischarge hearing
requirement.^''

Thus,

the personnel manual is not part of an

employment contract unless the manual is

a

modification of

the contract and supported by independent consideration.
The Illinois cases exemplify a different treatment of

services to be rendered.

The courts regard commencing work

court also found that the employee's thirty days'
notice before resigning and certain grievance procedures
satisfy mutuality of obligation.
^^78 111. App.3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979).
^''The

^^397
''Id.

N.E.2d at 446.
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as no consideration,^^ whereas they regard continuing to

work after

a

new handbook is approved by employees as

a

sufficient independent consideration to make the handbook
binding.

The courts should have a specific explanation why

an employee who accepts and commences work from an employer,

who has already promulgated a personnel policy,

ered not to have bargained for that policy.

is consid-

There must be

good justification for the distinction between continuing
to work and commencing work in these instances.

Having struggled with the traditional treatment of
employment handbooks, as Illinois did, more and more

jurisdictions abandon the requirements of bargain,

mutuality of obligation, and additional consideration in
the employment context. The traditional contract analysis

has revealed its limitations and inadequacy to deal with
the realities of the workplace in the employment context. ^^
The more courts lean toward application of the

traditional treatment of employee handbooks, the more the

approach they take becomes dogmatic.

A typical example

is

the application of the additional consideration doctrine.

by agreeing to be bound by
the handbook when commencing employment, the employee
"merely agreed to properly perform his required duties and
nothing more"); see also^ Evis v. Continental 111. Nat'l
397 N.E.2d 446

^^Sargent,

(

Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876, 879 (N.D. 111. 1984).
^^Courts and commentators to a large extent view the
employment relationship as a unilateral contract, as

Bank

&

opposed to as

a

bilateral contract.
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The additional consideration doctrine originally comes

from the consideration doctrine in American contract law
that consideration functions as

a

more objective and

evidentiary proof for the parties' intent.

In the employ-

it is certainly more probable that "the

ment context,

parties intended

a

continuing relationship, with limita-

tions upon the employer's dismissal authority, when the

employee has provided some benefit to the employer or
some detriment, beyond the usual rendition of

suffer [ed]
service.

"^°°

Thus,

the traditional rule requiring independ-

ent consideration is only a rule of construction,

substance;

^°'

courts should avoid

a

not of

mechanical, arbitrary

application of this doctrine in the employment context.
The courts rejecting the additional consideration require-

ments embrace the viewpoint that additional consideration
in order to enforce an employer's promises of job security
is not necessary where it can be determined the parties

intended to be bound by certain terms.
courts, however,

doctrine

A minority of

still hold to the additional consideration

^°^
.

See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981).
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925.
^°^Id. at 326,
'°°Pugh V.

324,

'"^Indiana and Kentucky are such examples.

Murphee

Alabama Farm Bureau ins. Co. (Ala 449 So. 2d 1218,
General Electric Co. (WD Ky) 697 F. Supp. 946.

Shah

v.
v.

.
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2.

The Progressive Approach

Responding to increasing criticism against the
traditional contract analysis in cases dealing with
employee handbooks, more and more jurisdictions in the
1980

began to reappraise such

's

thus to develop

a new,

a

formalistic theory and

more progressive approach in this

area of law.

a.

Unilateral Contract Analysis

A major feature of the progressive courts that find
statements in employee handbooks binding is
to utilize unilateral contract analysis.

a

willingness

"In most of the

cases involving an employer's personnel policy manual,

the

document is prepared without any negotiations and is

voluntarily distributed to the employees,

"^°^

though it is

not always necessary for the company to prepare such a

document
The voluntary nature of the manual shows that it seeks
no return promise from the employees.

Thus,

the unilateral

contract analysis is perfectly adequate in employment
cases'^'*

in which the manual is an offer from the employer

that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract and the
^°^Woolley V.

1985)

99 N.J.

284,

Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,
491 A. 2d 1257,

(Sup.

Ct.

of N.J,

1267.

unilateral contrct theory may be inappropriate for analyzing complex, multi-party transactions, it
has been widely deemed appropriate for employment and
handbbok scenarios." Pratt, Comments at 210.
'"''"Although

.
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performance of services serves as consideration in exchange for the employer's promise.

'""^

Today, many states

have recognized implied unilateral contracts in the employ-

ment context.

This new approach to employment handbook

^"^^

cases has disposed of the problematic traditional

requirements of independent consideration and mutuality of
obligation.
One seminal case,
Shield,

^^"^

analysis.

adopted

a

Toussaint

Blue Cross

v.

&

Blue

variation on the unilateral contract

In this case,

which joined two separate cases

with similar but somewhat different circumstances,

^°^

Toussaint claimed that he was orally assured of job

See generally, M. Petit, Modern Unilateral
Contracts, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 551 (1983)
^^^See Krueger, supra note 41, at 649 (Table 1.
Chronology of Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine
of the Fifty States)
'°M08 Mich. 549, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
lo^Two separate cases are consolidated in Toussaint.
^'^"Id.

.

Plaintiffs Toussaint and Ebling, both middle-level managers,
were discharged after serving five and two years for Blue
"Toussaint
Cross and Masco Corporation respectively.
testified that he was told he would be with the company 'as
Ebling testified that he was told
long as I did my job.'
doing the job' he would not be dischargthat if he was
Each claimed that he had received
ed. "(292 N.W.2d at 884).
oral assurances at the time of hiring that he would not be
discharged without just or good cause. It should be noted
that Toussaint^ s case is stronger because he was also
handed a manual of the company personnel policies which
reinforced the oral assurances of job security.
'
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security when hired^°^ and that he was also handed
"Supervisory Manual" with

contained

a

a

a

pamphlet of "Guidelines" which

"just cause" provision.

^^^

One of the disputes was whether the company policies

regarding job security contained in the Manual and
Guidelines were enforceable as part of Toussaint's employment contract or mere gratuitous statements of intent.

Relying on established doctrines of contract formation,
Blue Cross contended that separate and distinct conside-

ration other than services should be required in order for

employment contracts to be enforceable

^^^
.

The company

adhered to the additional consideration doctrine.
The company also put emphasis on the necessity of

mutuality of obligation in the instant

case.'^^

In response

to the idea that courts should inquire into adequacy of

mutuality of obligation, the Supreme Court of Michigan
rejected the idea by saying that the enforceability of a
contract depends on consideration, not on mutuality of
obligation.

^'"^

The court regarded mutuality of obligation

as a legal doctrine unworthy of addressing;

synonymous with consideration."^^''

'°M08 Mich,

"at best it was

The court in Pugh

292 N.W.2d at 883,
292 N.W.2d at 903-04.

at 595,

^^°Id.

at 638-40,

^^^292

N.W.2d at 885.

61,

'''Id.
'''Id.

^'^Holloway

&

Leech, supra note 81,

at 89.

884,

v.

890
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See's Candies^

Inc.^^"

also agreed that there is no

requirement of mutuality of obligation if the requirement
of consideration is met.'^^

The concept of mutuality in

employment contract cases is being widely

discredited.

^^'^

The most significant issue then concentrates on what
is exchanged between the employer and employee that amounts

to consideration.

The Toussaint majority noted as follows:

While an employer need not establish
personnel policies or practice, where
an employer chooses to establish such
policies and practices and makes them
known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably
enhanced.
The employer secures an
orderly, cooperative and loyal work
force, and the employee the peace of
mind associated with job security and
the conviction that he will be treated fairly. ... It is enough that the
employer chooses, presumably in its
own interest, to create an environment in which the employee believes
that, whatever the personnel policies
and practices, they are established
and official at any give time.

^^^203

Cal. App.3d 743,

^^^Id.

at 751,

250 Cal Rp

.

195

(1988).

250 Cal. Rp. at 200.

River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622,
629 (1983) ("we see no merit in the lack of mutuality
argument ); and JVeiner v. Mcgraw-Hill, Inc., N.Y., 443
N.E.2d 441 444 (1982) ("while coextensive promises may
in
constitute consideration for each other, 'mutuality,
the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is not necessary
when a promise receives other valid consideration").
^^'^Pine

'
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purport to be fair,
ed consistently and
each employee.
The
created a situation
obligation. "^^^

and are appliuniformly to
employer has then
"instinct with

The majority first states that it is the company that

has created

a

special environment in which the employee

shall not be discharged without just cause by establishing

personnel policies providing job security, though it is not
The majority opinion then state that

forced to do so.

employees' reliance on written assurances of job security

creates

a

cooperative and loyal workforce,

quently confers

a

which conse-

^^^

benefit on the employer.

Because the

employer has taken that initiative and enjoyed the benefit
of the employees'

satisfactory job performance through the

job security promise,

^^°

the court finds an implied contract

of just cause discharge that the employer must recognize.

Although majority does not apparently overrule
precedent requiring additional consideration,
approach to enforcement of

118

408 Mich.,

at 613,

a

^^^

this

promise of job security is at

292 N.W.2d at 892

'''Id.

Holloway & Leech, supra note 81, at 89-90
("[i]nstead of searching in vain for a reciprocal
commitment from the employee, the court found improved
morale to be the benefit to the employer in exchange for
its job security commitments").
'^^See

'''Id.
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odds with the formalistic, bargained for exchange view
^^^

of contract.

Noting that Toussaint did not receive the Manual and
Guidelines or even learn of their existence until after he
was hired/''^ the dissent concluded that "no meeting of

minds occurred on the proposition that the defendant's

Manual or Guidelines, or any part of either, would
constitute the plaintiffs employment contract as claimg^^.!i24

Hence the dissent regarded preemployment negotia-

tion as a special circumstance,
lent of consideration,

^^^

as amounting to the equiva-

while the majority held that no

preemployment negotiation over job security need take
place.

^^^

Indeed,

attack

on'

the impact of the Toussaint decision in the

the traditional contract approach can be proved

by the fact that an impressive number of jurisdictions have

followed Toussaint

's

rational in wrongful discharge cases.

supra note 18, at 351 ("this is heresy as
far as traditional contract law is concerned").
123408 Mich. 579, 644, 292 N.W.2d at 906 {emphasis
'^^Linzer,

speaks of Toussaint
receiving manuals at his meeting with the company Treasurer
added)
Id.

.

The Majority, however,

at 597 n.5,

292 N.W.2d at 884 n.5.

^^^Id.

at 646,

^^'"Id.

at

292 N.W.2d at 907.

641 n.4,

292 N.W.2d at 904.

("The record

bears no evidence that during Mr. Toussaint 's several
preemployment interviews, any reference was made either to
the Manual or Guidelines.") 292 N.W.2d at 906.
^^^"[A]nd the parties' minds need not meet on the
subject") Id. at n.4, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
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however,

It seems,

that Toussaint,

invoking the idea of

reliance, has made personnel manuals binding through the
use of a promissory estoppel coloring approach rather than
the use of unilateral contract analysis.

The Restatement

of contracts defines promissory estoppel as

(Second)

follows:

"

[a]

promise which the promisor should reasonably

expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of

promisee or

a

a

third person and which does induce such

action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be

avoided only by enforcement of the promise

"^^"^
.

According to the definition, there are four requirements:

First,

there must be a promise; Second,

the promise

must be one the promisor should reasonably expect to induce

action or forbearance; Third, the promisee must actually
act or forbear to his detriment; and Fourth,

the promise

should be enforced only if injustice otherwise would result.
Justice Ryan in his dissent refers to this point and says
that "[w]hile the plaintiff in [Toussaint]

pleaded

a

case has not

claim of promissory estoppel concerning his

wrongful termination claim, even if one be assumed, the
record before us is without any evidence whatever that

Toussaint relied upon any policy statements contained in
the Supervisory Manual or the Guidelines concerning the

duration of his employment, notice of termination or
entitlement to written or oral warnings prior to

1

07

Restatement

(Second)

of Contracts §90,

fl

(1979)

,
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termination either as an inducement to become employed
by or to remain in the employment of the defendant

"^"^
.

It

might be possible to construe the case as that the employer
has received consideration in the form of a "cooperative

and loyal workforce

"^^^
.

Nevertheless,

Toussaint failed to

address the issue of consideration fully, which several
other cases in the last decade have attempted to discuss

more precisely.
The Minnesota Supreme Court of Pine River State Bank

contains

Mettile^'^^

River,

a

review of contract formation.

In Pine

the bank fired a former employee, Mettille,

officer,

v.

a

loan

and sued him on two notes on which he was in

default.

Mettille counterclaimed, alleging that the bank

had breached his employment contract, dismissing him

without cause and in violation of the disciplinary

procedures set forth in the employee handbook.

distributed to all of its employees

^^^Toussaint,

408 Mich,

at 649,

a

^^^^

The bank

printed employee

650,

292 N.W.2d at 908.

The dissent further distinguished job security from

proposes of a bonus, pension benefits, or severance pay
that the employer should reasonably have expected would
induce reliance by the employee in joining or remaining on
the job.

Id.

use of promissory estoppel as a substitute for
consideration is recognized in some cases. E.g.^ Scholtes
^^^The

Signal Delivery Serv.
1982)

,

Inc.,

548 F.

.

'^°333

N.W.2d 622

^'^'Id.

at 624-25.

(Minn.

1983).

Supp.

487,

492

v.

(W.D.Ark.
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handbook containing specific provisions regarding job
security and disciplinary policy.
The central issue was whether a personnel handbook,

distributed after the plaintiff was hired, can become part
of the employee's contract of employment

^"^^
.

In analyzing

the court recognized the importance of the

the issue,

discussion concerning the need for the agreement process,
i.e.,

an offer and an acceptance

.

''^'^

This is based on

contract formation that requires an offer, acceptance and
consideration.

^^"^

The court begins its contract analysis by noting that
a

handbook can become part of the employment contract if

the requirements for formation of a unilateral contract,
(offer,

acceptance,

more precise,

a

and consideration)

are met.^^°

To be

promise of employment on particular terms

of unspecified duration may create a binding unilateral

contract,

if the offer,

cated to the offeree,

definite in form, has been communi-

the employee,

and there has been an

{emphasis supplied)
("Whether a handbook can become part of the
^^•^Jd.
employment contract raises such issues of contract formation as offer and acceptance and consideration").
^^^utual assent pervades all three contract elements:
Restatement
(Second) of
offer, acceptance and consideration.
^'^^Id.

at 625

Contracts §§3,
^^°Pine

627.

5124,

.

50

&

71

(1979).

River State Bank

v.

Mettille,

333 N.W.2d at 625,

.
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acceptance of the offer and consideration furnished for
its enforceability.''^^
In this case,

according to the court, the alleged

provisions of the handbook
language an offer of

a

section'"^'

do set out in definite

unilateral contract for procedures

to be followed in job termination.

This offer was communi-

cated to the employees including respondent, by dissemi-

nation of the handbook.

Mettile's continued performance of

although free to quit, constitutes an accept-

his duties,

ance of the bank's offer and also supplies the necessary

consideration for that offer.

'^^

Hence, procedural re-

straints on termination of employees contained in the

employment handbook were held contractually binding, and

Mettille was wrongfully discharged contrary to those
provisions
As to consideration,
that

a

the court disposed of the idea

provision for job security in

a

contract of in-

definite duration was not binding without additional,
independent consideration other than services to be
performed.

'-^^

The independent consideration rule was not

regarded as the exclusive means for creating an enforceable

^^^Id.

at 626-27.

This portion of the employee handbook
The handbook section
was entitled "Disciplinary Policy."
entitled "Job Security", however, was not found definite
^^'^Id.

at 630.

enough to constitute any offer. Id.
'''Id.
^'^^Id.

at 628-29.

.
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job security provision; it served,
function.^'"'

at best,

an evident

The gist of Pine Riveras treatment of the

consideration issue is that the court recognized the
employee's continued labor despite his freedom to leave as
sufficient consideration for implied promises

^''^
.

The court

also mentioned that it found no need to distinguish hand-

book provisions of job security from those of bonuses,
severance pay or commission rates which were enforced with
a

single performance,

the continued labor,

^"^^

This approach

seems more plain than the "reasonable expectations"

standard applied by the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint
The courts' discussion,

as in Pine River,

of implied

unilateral promises of job security ranges over several
important subissues.

Some of the factors courts consider

necessary to finding that the manual is an implied contract
are as follows:

the question of when the manual was given

to the employee,

at the time of hire or some time after;

the question of whom the manual was given to and whom it

was intended to cover; and the question of whether and to

See also, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
'''^"Despite, her freedom to resign, an employee's labor,
particularly if continued faithfully and satisfactorily
over a reasonable period of time, is ample consideration to
support all of an employer's express or implied promises
including those related to job security." Note, supra note
1819-20.
9, at 1816,
^^°Id.

at 629.

.

'''Id.

.
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what extent the employee knew its provisions or of

whether the employee was even aware of its existence.
As to the first question,

for the courts in Toussaint

and Pine River, it made no difference whether the manual
was given to the employee at the time of the original

hiring or later,
V.

McGraw-Hill ,

^''^

The New York Court of Appeals in Weiner

Inc.,^'^

however, held job security promises

contained in the handbook enforceable only because they

existed at the time of hiring. ^^^

In the course of dis-

cussions looking towards his joining McGraw-Hill,

Inc.,

plaintiff was orally assured of job security as well as

well-paying position.

^''^

the
a

During the course of these

discussions, he signed and submitted the application

specifying that his employment would be subject to the

provisions of the employee handbook prohibiting discharge

^"^^Toussaint,

also. Pine river,

408 Mich.

579,

333 N.W.2d 622,

292 N.W.2d 880,
629 and 630

See
("We hold,
892.

therefore, that where an employment contract is for an
indefinite duration, such indef initeness by itself does not
preclude handbook provisions on job security from being
enforceable, whether they are proffered at the time of the
original hiring or later, when the parties have agreed to
be bound therby") {emphasis added)
1^57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457, N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982)
^^''Id.

.

at 465,

443 N.E.2d at 445,

457 N.Y.S.2d at 197

[emphasis added).
^^^The plaintiff had been working for another publisher,
a competitor, for 4 years when he was invided by McGrawHill to discuss joining it.
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without "just cause."
employment,

During the eighth year of his

the plaintiff was dismissed allegedly for "lack

of application.

"^^'^

In upholding a breach of contract claim,

the court

concluded that the plaintiff should be entitled to establish an implied-in-f act contract obligation not to be

discharged without just cause under certain circumstances
surrounding the employment relationship.

The circumstances

the court found essential to state a cause of action

consist of four factual grounds:

(1)

inducement based on

oral assurances of just cause employment;

(2)

incorporated in the employment application;
reliance; and

(4)

the assurance

(3)

detrimental

the defendant's general enforcement of

its just cause policy.

^'*^

The court found it important that

the job security policy existed at the time of hiring.

The

company was bound by the just cause policy, and it received

consideration in the form of the employee's initial and
continued employment or in the form of the employee's
rejecting other offers of employment in reliance on the
policy.
The court also noted that "it is not

[an employer's]

subjective intent nor any single act, phrase or other
expression, but 'the totality of all of these,

given the

attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties, and
^^"^57

N.Y.2d at 460,

443 N.E.2d at 442,

457 N.Y.S.2d at

197.
148

Id.

at 465,

443 N.E.2d at 445,

457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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the objectives they were striving to attain,' which will

control.

"^^^

In the Weiner court's point of view,

all the

course of conduct of the parties combined to state

good

a

cause of action for breach of contract.

Where an employee brings suit for wrongful discharge
in violation of the terms of the handbook,

the question of

whether the handbook was intended to cover the employee is
relevant.

The New Jersey supreme court in Woolley

v.

Hoffmann-La Roche^^^ held that implied promises that it will
discharge employees only for just cause in an employee

handbook distributed by

a

large employer to its workforce

are enforceable by all the employees.

Woolley, hired as an engineering section head,
for breach of contract,

sued

complaining that the express and

implied promises in the personnel manual created

a

contract

underwhich he could not be fired without just cause.
this company,

^"''^

In

the manual was generally distributed to

supervisory personnel, however, the court in Woolley placed
great emphasis on the fact that the manual was circulated

^^^Id.

at 466-67,

443 N.E.2d at 446,

457 N.Y.S.2d at

The court's decision in Weiner has been criticied by
some comentators, "[T]he court's decision was problematic
since the majority merely listed four factors in the record
198.

without providing any indication as to the importance of
any particular fact or mixture of factors." Minda, supra
note 29, at 1145.
'^°99

^^'491

N.J. 284,

491 A. 2d 1257

A. 2d at 1258.

(1985).
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among

a

substantial number of its employees, who thus

reasonably believed that the provisions should cover not
only

a

well.

^^2

particular class of employees but all employees as

The court concluded that when an employer of a sub-

stantial number of employees circulates

manual providing

a

certain benefits such as job security, the judiciary should
construe them in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the employees

^°"^
.

In this point,

the Woolley court

adopted the same "reasonable expectations" standard applied
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint

manual's extensive dissemination,

.

By the

in the absence of contra-

dicting evidence, both the reasonable expectations of the
employees to be covered by the provisions and the

employer's intent to apprise all employees of the benefits it conferred were implied.

^^'^

The general rule is that

an employee whom a manual was not intended to cover may not

sue the company for breach of contract based on the manual.

This may be overcome by other circumstantial evidence that
the company intended the manual to apply to all employees
as in Woolley and IVeiner.'"

^'^Id.

at 297-98,

491 A. 2d 1264-65.

^'^Id.

Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Petroleum
Products Co., 3 Individual Employment Rights Cases 336
(Conn. 1987) (the court held that the manual, which was
distributed only to supervisory personnel, was not intended
^^^See,

.
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The Woolley court clearly characterized the employ-

ment relationship bound by the employee handbook as a

unilateral contract.

^^^

"In most of the cases involving an

employer's personnel policy manual, the document is

prepared without any negotiations and is voluntarily
distributed to the workforce by the employer.
return promise from the employees

"^^"^
.

Thus,

It seeks no

the court

concludes that it is reasonable to interpret the manual as
a

unilateral offer,

'^^

in the form of promise.

In order for a unilateral offer in the form of promise
to be enforceable,

consideration.

it must be accepted and supported by

Several questions arise from analysis

^^^

that performance of job duties in response to an employer's

unilateral offer simply satisfies both acceptance and
consideration.

Realistically, employees receiving

a

manual,

reading it, and relying upon the policies would reasonably
expect that those policies will be followed and that they

to cover employees like the plaintiff,

who was

a

non-

managerial marketing representative)
'^*^99

N.J.

at 301-04,

491 A. 2d at 1267.

In a bilateral

contract, however, promise is given in exchange for a
promise rather than for performance. As to the
requirements in a bilateral contract, see the privious

Chapter.
^^^99

N.J.' at

304,

491 A. 2d at 1267.

'''Id.

'^^Unilateral contract analysis views the employment

handbook as an implied contract if the requirements of
offer, acceptance and consideration are met.

.
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will become the beneficiaries of those policies.

knowledge of the manual,

With

the employee's continuing work

when free to quit evinces acceptance and consideration.
the court's ruling is correct.

that situation,

In

^^°

However, would the courts conclude that the continued

work of employees who are unaware of the policies of job

security contained in
and consideration?

handbook evinces both acceptance

a

It seems anomalous to conclude that

employees who are totally unaware of employment terms

providing job security can be expected to respond by being
a

"cooperative and loyal work force.

"^^^

The majority in Toussaint held that it is un-

necessary that the employee know of the particulars of the
employer's policies and practices

What seems important

.^^^

under the court's analysis is the fact that the employer

published the policy for the employees'

benefit.^^"^

The

court in Woolley seems to follow Toussaint or even more to

extend the scope of the unilateral contract treatment of

acceptance and consideration.'^''
The Idaho court in Watson

Hospitals^

Inc.^^'"

is an opposite example.

N.J. at 301-04,

'^°99

''^'Harris, Rutgers L.

^^^Toussaint,

Idaho Falls Consolidated

v.

491 A.

J.

408 Mich,

715,

Citing Woolley,

2d at 1266-68.
at 732

at 613,

(1986).

292 N.W.2d at 892.

'''Id.

''^Woolley,
'^^1

1986)

99 N.J.

at 304,

491,

A. 2d at 1268 n.lO.

Individual Employment Rights Cases 1540

(Idaho,

.
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the Idaho Supreme Court noted that in employee handbook

cases and in the employment relationship,

all that is

required as consideration is that the plaintiff continued
to work under the terms of the manual and relied on it.

The court's finding that the handbook constituted a uni-

lateral contract was partly, but indeed,

supported by the

plaintiff's testimony that she and other employees read and

relied upon the handbook as creating the terms of her
contract of employment

^^^
.

As discussed above,

a

uniform rule of unilateral

contract analysis has not been established in employee

handbook cases especially where the employee does not know
the particulars or even existence of job security provi-

sions in the handbook.

If courts consistently apply the

strict contract formation in contract law requiring an
and consideration,

to the employment

offer,

an acceptance,

cases,

they will confront its inherent limitations.

In

fact that the handbook was distributed to

^^^The

employees and their signatures were required to establish
receipt of the handbook reassured the existence of the
One commentator also
agreement process in this case.
argues with the holding of Woolley by indicating that the
"Anthony court [51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A. 2d 762], on which
the Woolley court relied, explicitly required that the
employee know of the offer in order to conclude that
employee reliance would be presumed where an employer makes
promises through its policy statements." Harris, supra
note 161, at 731. ("the supreme court [of Woolley]
neglected to mention this vital point in its own
analysis

.

"

)
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order for the offer of job security to be accepted, the

employee needs at least to know of the offer's existence,
not to say its particulars.

The courts'

analysis of the

benefits of an orderly, cooperative and loyal workforce as

consideration is correct in situations where the employee
knows of the provision.

The analysis is rather strained

where the employee does not know of the provision.

Accordingly,

it is reasonable to conclude that a

promise contained in an employee handbook becomes part of
an employment contract under unilateral contract analysis,
if the following conditions are met:

(1)

a

promise in the

handbook is sufficiently definite to constitute an offer;
(2)

the offer must be communicated to the employee,

instance, by the dissemination of the handbook; and
a

^^''

for
(3)

as

the employee who is aware of the policy

general rule,

accepts the offer and supplies the necessary consideration
by commencing work or continuing to work.

b.

Unilateral Alterations to Employee Handbooks and Effect
of Disclaimers

Ironically,

erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine

among state courts through handbook exceptions has yielded
some favorable results for employers.

WooUey court held that

Like Toussaint,

if the employer,

the

for whatever

courts are fairly consistent on this requirement
of def initeness
^^'^The

.

55

reason, does not want the manual to be capable of being

construed by the court as

a

binding contract,

need be done is the inclusion in

a

"all that

very prominent position

of an appropriate statement that there is no promise of any

kind by the employer contained in the manual.

"^^^

Inserting

such disclaimer language in the handbook is favorable for

employers wishing to avoid being sued based on implied

contract theories.
But situations where employers unilaterally alter

existing employee handbooks are rather problematic.

Such

court decisions as in Toussaint and Pine River respectively

referred to the issue of contract modification and stated
that an employer may subsequently and unilaterally change a

handbook provision so as not to be bound by it as
contract.

In Pine River,

for example,

a

the court notes that

"[Ijanguage in the handbook itself may reserve discretion
to the employer in certain matters or reserve the right to

amend or modify the handbook provisions

"^^^
.

It is certainly a wise idea for an employer to review

the contents of an employee handbook and to keep it current

by eliminating outdated,

inapplicable rules and adding new

provisions to improve the labor relations environment of
the workplace.

^^^Woolley,

In that sense,

as the Pine River court

491 A. 2d at 1271.

^^^Pine river,

333 N.W.2d at 627

.

1

.
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mentions,

"

[u]

nilateral contract modification of the

employment contract may be
In reality,

however,

a

repetitive process

surveys^'''^

"^"^^
.

and case histories

suggest that the changes actually made almost always

disfavored the employees; alterations to employee handbooks from discharge for cause to termination at-will.
Such alterations have great impact especially on employees
who may be fired soon after such

of long service,

alterations

Hence,

^'^^
.

the harsh effects of employer

alteration of handbooks raise a question of whether
detrimental unilateral amendments are effective automati-

cally upon the employee remaining at work.
Only

a

handful of jurisdictions have considered the

issue of employer alteration of handbooks.

Valley Nat

'1

Bank^''^

Chambers

v.

is one of the cases that has allowed

survey conducted in New York State found that
fifty percent of responding companies had recently changed
the language in their handbooks to clarify their employment-at-will policy." Jack Stieber and Mark D. Baines, The
Michigan Experience with Employment- at-Will, 67 Neb. L. Rev.
''^^"A

140,

171 n.241

(1988)

Care Corp., No. 1-85-1 (Ohio App.
may 13, 1986) (Westlaw, Ohio Cts Database) (an employer added
a disclaimer to a handbook with just cause provisions and
soon after fired an employee); Chambers v. Valley nat
Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D. Ariz. 1988) (an employee
with 14 yrs of service was fired soon after a just cause
^''^E.g.,

King

v.

Hosp.

'

handbook was disclaimed)
1^3721

F.

Supp.

1128

(D.

Ariz.

1988).

.
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unilateral modification by employers.

In Chambers,

bank revised its original manual that had contained

the
a

discharge-for-cause provision and disclaimed any obligation
to discharge for cause.

employer's inclusion of

The court characterized the
a

disclaimer in

a

handbook publish-

ed subsequent to plaintiff's employment as an offer to

modify

unilateral contract, which the plaintiff accepted

a

by continuing to

work.'''''^

This logic is based on the

unilateral contract theory that if an employer's handbook
is specific enough to constitute an offer,

an employee's

commencement of work or continuation constitutes both
acceptance and consideration.
One recent case,

Bankey

v.

Storer Broadcasting

Co.,^'^^

also upheld unilateral modifications but on a different

basis.

In Banky,

service filed

a

a

discharged salesman with 13 years of

complaint,

alleging that there existed

a

policy that the company would not terminate its employees
without just cause and that he continued to work for the
store in reliance upon that policy.

^"^^

In fact,

the company

revised its Digest to eliminate any for cause requirement
for discharge of its employees two months prior to his

See also, Bookshaw v. South St
Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct App. 1986)
(stating that if an employer alters existing policies, a
new unilateral contract is offered which the employee
'^"•id.

at 1131-32.

.

accepts by remaining on the job)
'^•M32 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112
'''Id.

(1989).

.
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termination,

^"^"^

The Michigan Supreme Court held that "an

employer may, without an express reservation of the right
to do so,

unilaterally change its written policy from one

to discharge for cause to one of termination at will,

provided that the employer gives affected employees
reasonable notice of the policy change.

"^"^^

In analyzing the enforceability of a new policy,

this

court finds it inappropriate to apply unilateral contract

theory in this instance.'''^

The court,

instead,

relies on

"the analysis employed in Toussaint which focused upon the

benefit that accrues to an employer when it establishes

desirable personnel policies

"^^^
.

The Toussaint analysis

states that an employer who chooses to establish desirable
policies,

discharge-for-cause,

such as one of

is seeking

to promote an environment conductive to collective produc-

tivity.

The benefit the employer derives by establishing

^^^

such policies,
force)

,

loyal, productive and cooperative work

gives rise to

obligation,
177

(a

Id.

^'^^In

"'^^

Thus,

at 442,

a

situation "instinct with an

when,

as in the question before us.

443 N.W,2d at 114

{Bankey v. Storer
432 Mich, 438, 443 N,W,2d 112 (Mich,

re Certified Question

Broadcasting Co.),
1989)

This court does not
reject the applicability of unilateral contract theory in
other situations.
'^^Jd.

at 454,

443 N,W,2d at 119

.

'''Id.

''^Toussaint,

408 Mich,

at 613,

292 N.W.2d at 892,

.

s

.
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the employer chooses to revoke its desirable policy,

the

employer's benefit is correspondingly extinguished as is
the rationale for the court's enforcement of the dis-

charge-for-cause policy.

^^"^

This notion of mutual injury^^ and the premise that an

employer should certainly retain discretions to change its
policies, when necessary,

to correspond to the business'

needs underlie the argument permitting unilateral modifications.

On fairness grounds,

the court in Bankey required

that reasonable notice be given to the affected employees
for the revocation of a discharge-for-cause policy to

become legally ef fective .^^°
Indeed,

as the court notes,

a

business policy is

generally understood as"a flexible framework for operational guidance,

obligation,

not

"'^^

[as]

perpetual binding contractual

which supports the unilateral amendment of

employment manuals.
statement in

a

In this sense,

Enyeart^^''

a

Missouri court's

may be true that

^'the

employer is

commentator notes "such changes injure the
employer just as they injure the employee." Pratt, supra
note 15, at 218 n.l37.
'^"^One

^^Id.

at 219.

432 Mich,

^^^Bankey,

at 456,

443 N.W.2d at 120

("Fairness suggests that a discharge-for-cause policy
announced with flourishes and fanfare at noonday should not
be revoled by a pennywhistle trill at midnight")
'''Id.

''"^Enyeart

123

(Mo.App.

v.

1985)

Shelter Mutual Ins. Co.,

693 S.W.2d 120,
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contractually bound to observe [its] policies until they
are modified or withdrawn.

"^^^

Nevertheless, the issue that the employer's change in

policy purported to affect employee benefits secured under
the first handbook must be discussed more carefully.

one commentator suggests,

"issuing

As

second unilaterally

a

modified handbook is not the same as issuing the first"^^^
because "the [modified] handbook constitutes an offer to

modify the existing implied contract

"^^°
.

In Bankey,

the

unilaterally modified handbook constituted an offer to

modify the existing contract of discharge-for-cause to the
detriment of the employee, one of termination-at-will

.

The

existence of the legitimate expectations of affected
employees grounded in the discharge-for-cause policy makes
such cases complicated to deal with.
Some foreign jurisdictions have dealt with the issue
of the enforceability of a unilaterally modified handbook
to the detriment of the employee and have advanced rather

restrictive views of its enforceability.

The Supreme Court

of Japan held that the employer's change in policy purport-

ing to affect employee benefits already accrued or vested

may be binding only with an absolutely reasonable cause to
alter.

'9'

{emphasis added)
^^^Pratt, supra note 15,
'^^Jd.

^®°Jd.

.

[emphasis added)

1^^1968-12-25 MiNSHU.

.

at 221
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Two English cases held that an employer may uni-

laterally change its employment rules, provided that the
employer gives affected employees reasonable notice of the
rule change

^^^
.

Hepple supported the ruling, noting that

the contract may be legally binding based on the principle
of promissory estoppel

^^'^
.

Under the principle of promis-

sory estoppel, requiring that reasonable notice of a change
that revokes a discharge-for-cause policy must be uniformly given to affected employees protects legitimate expec-

tations of the employees who worked under this view.

Without reasonable notice or other means to protect the
expectations, employers would be allowed to change their

policies only when absolutely necessary.
doubtful, however,

It

would be

for courts to apply such a reasonable

standard as that of Japan to the cases in which the employer is attempting to alter the handbook from a discharge-

for-cause to one of termination at-will because "the
concept of 'accrued or vested rights

[in this country]

cannot be stretched to include the right not to be dis-

charged except for just cause.

"^^^

Eastwood [1975] I.T. 885 (Q.B.), James v.
Hepworth and Grandage Lt. [1968] I.Q.B. 94 (C.A.).
^^^Hepple, B.A., Employment Law, 4th ed., 1981.
^^"^Ottawa Co. v. Jaklinski, 423 Mich. 1, 26, 377 N.W.2d
668 (1985). "Vested or accrued rights" in Michigan include
Psutka v. michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich 318,
as followes:
264 N.W. 385 (1936) (pensions and death benefits); and
^^^Carus V.

.
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Like Toussaint,

the analysis employed in Bankey

seems to be close to the principle of promissory estoppel.

Courts making employee handbooks binding through the use of

promissory estoppel need not search for offer, acceptance,
and consideration; instead,

they look for an employee's

reasonable reliance upon statements made by the employer.
The courts simply prefer a promissory estoppel approach in

employee handbook cases, or some of

unilateral contract approach.

^^''

theme

may shrink from

Although the Banky court

clearly states that the use of unilateral contract theory
is not appropriate in the instant case,^^^

it seems to say

so in order to avoid struggling with contractual obstacles.
In analyzing the enforceability of the unilaterally

modified handbook from one of discharge for cause to one of
termination at-will, the most important factor to which
courts should look is acceptance by affected employees.

reasonable notice given to all employees is

that sense,

useful for

a

jury to determine that continued work

satisfies both acceptance and consideration.

Thus,

assumption that continued work by the employee automatically makes the unilaterally modified handbook binding is
hasty.

White Motor Corp., 54 Mich 143, 220 N.W.2d 697
(1974) (severance pay)
^^^A difference betwee these two approaches lies in
See, Pratt, supra note 15, at 216.
damages.
'^^Justice Boyle in his concurring agrees with the
Bankey, supra note 178.
majority.

Gaydos

v.

In
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The applicability of unilateral contract theory in

the above situations should be judged based upon whether
the court pays careful attention to the agreement process

not the mere fact of the employee continuing to work.

Today courts and commentators to

a

large extent

generally view the employment relationship as
contract.

a

unilateral

Unilateral contract analysis disposes of the

traditional obstacles of bilateral contract and is viewed
as particularly useful,

combined with the progressive court

approach to consideration in the employee handbook context.
The history of contract exception cases also reflects

public interests stated in private agreements.

The court's

application of contract law in both ordinary handbook cases
and those of modification, however,

leaves questions to be

resolved.

C.

The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

An employee may allege that the employer's action

violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied by law in every contract.

The idea of implying

such an obligation into employment contracts was extended
from other contract developments, particularly the provisions of the Uniform Commercial

Code^^'^

and the Restatement

§1-203 provides: "Every contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement."
^^"^U.C.C.

.
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that every contract imposes a duty

of Contracts'^®

(Second)

of good faith in its performance.

California,

for example,

has led the way in developing

causes of action to protect at-will employees,

allowing

a

first

contract cause of action, then a tort cause of

action for discharge in violation of public policy, and
also a cause of action for discharge based on breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. California

appellate courts allowed even tort relief for breach of the
implied covenant until the California Supreme Court de-

termined in Foley

v.

Interactive Data Corp. that an employ-

er's breach of the implied covenant is not a tort.'^^

While some courts recognize the rule under certain
circumstances, ^°° most of the jurisdictions still reject

a

cause of action for breach of the implied covenant in

employment contracts, arguing that "although there may be
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in other

types of contracts

(e.g.,

sales,

various commercial transaction)

,

implied in employment contracts,

insurance,

surest,

[or]

no such covenant should be
"^°'

because an implied

§205 (1981) provides:
"Every contract imposes uon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
'^^FoJey V. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254
'^^Restatement

Ca.

(Second)

of Contracts

Rptr. 211, 765 P. 2d 373.
^"^Accompanying text, n.41.
^"'Cerard P. Panaro, Employment Law Manual 8-39

Glrham

&

Lament,

Inc.

1990)

(Warren,
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covenant is considered inconsistent with the rule of

employment-at-will

.

Alternatively, courts argue that any

changes in the area of the employment law should be

accomplished legislatively and not by courts, ^°^
These conditions illustrate several problems:

first,

there is no uniform rationale for the theory of an implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing; second, states
vary on what elements the plaintiff must prove to establish
a case;

and third,

courts do not agree on whether breach of

an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is

strictly

a

contract action,

a

tort,

or both.

Thus,

this

type of wrongful discharge suit is probably the weakest and

most complicated of all types of wrongful discharge suits.

1.

The Historical Development

Review of the historical development of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing should start with
the New Hampshire Supreme Court case, Monge
Co.,^^'^

v.

Beebe Rubber

the seminal case on the bad-faith wrongful discharge

cause of action.

In Monge,

the plaintiff alleged the

employer may be subject to contract damages and compensatory damages for emotional distress for wrongful discharge
on a non statutory claim for sexual harassment on the

Supra note 14, at 8-38 - 8-40.
NH 130, 316 A. 2d 549 (N.H. 1974).

2°2panaro,
203114

.

.
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job.^^

Reversing the award of compensatory damages, the

New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for
contract damages and held "that

employer of

a

a

termination by the

contract of employment at will which is

motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is
not in the best interest of the economic system or the

public good and constitutes
contract.

a

breach of the employment

"2°^

Although the court in Monge injected public policy
considerations into the employment relationship and imposed
an obligation on the employer,

this case was rather

confusing as it included tort and contract concepts in
single holding. ^°^

Supreme Court,

a

Several years later, the New Hampshire

in Howard v.

Dorr Woolen

Co.,^^'^

suggested

that New Hampshire was aligned with the majority view that

permitted

a

public policy exception to the at-will rule and

case arose, sexual harrassment as a
The
violation of Title VII was not generally recognized.
Supreme Court has only recently held that sexual
harrassment is actionable as unlawful discrimination on the
basis of sex. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, All U.S. 57,
^"^When the

63-68

(1986)
^^'""Monge

114 NH at 132,

316 A. 2d at 551.

Employment -at -Will and the Aftermath
of Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 34 Saint Louis L.J. 695,
703 (1990)
See also, Tom May, The covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing: A Common Ground for the Torts of Wrongful
Discharge from Employment, 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1111, 1157
^°^Lucy A.

Singer,

.

(1981)
^°^120

NH 295,

414 A. 2d 1273

(1980)

.

.
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that it did not intend in Monge break new ground on a

bad-faith theory,

A year later, the court in

reconciled these two cases and articu-lated

a

Cloutier^'^^

two-part

apply in wrongful discharge cases alleging bad

test^°^ to

faith.

Despite New Hampshire's retreat, several courts began
to apply the bad-faith theory to wrongful discharge cases

on the rationale of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

The first case following Monge on this bases

was a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in Fortune

v.

National Cash Register

employee of National Cash Register as

Fortune,

Co.^^'^

a

an

regional salesman,

was fired to prevent the vesting of certain commission
rights.

The Supreme Judicial Court held that:

(1)

even

though the salesman's contract was terminable at will,
there was an implied covenant of good faith in the

contract; and

(2)

evidence supported the determination that

the employer had discharged the salesman in order to avoid

^°^Cloutier v.
915,

436 A. 2d 1140

Great Atlantic

&

Pacific Tea Co.,

121 NH

(1980)

order to recover damages, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was motivated by bad faith, malice,
or retaliation in terminating the plaintiff's employment;
in addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the firing
was because of the performance of an act that public policy
encouraged or the refusal to perform an act that public
209mjj-^

policy condemned."
2i°373 Mass 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251

(1977)

.
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paying certain bonuses to the salesman, ^^' hence breach of

Recognizing the general requirement in law

the covenant.

"that parties to contracts and commercial transactions must
act in good faith toward one another"^^^ and the existence
of this duty in the contract,

however, the court found it

unnecessary to reach the question as to whether all
employment contracts contained a duty of good faith and
fair dealing.

^^"^

The New Hampshire and Massachusetts courts

have shied away from

a

broad incorporation and adopted

instead more limited exceptions.''^
One of the influential decisions involving the duty of

good faith and fair dealing is Cleary
Airiines.^'°

In Cleary,

a

v.

American

plaintiff with 18 years' seniori-

ty who was discharged for alleged theft, brought suit on a

contract theory, arguing that the due process guaranteed in
the handbook and a general duty of good faith and fair

dealing were not followed. ^'^
2''364

N.E.2d 1256

^^^Id.

at 1257.

A California court of appeals

New Hampshire court limited Monge to discharges
that violate the usual public policy exception standard.
In Massachusetts, the
[See Haward, 120 N.H. at 297)
implied covenant was applied only in cases in which
employees lost "identifiable, reasonably anticipated future
past services" because of a
compensation, based on
discharge without cause. (Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Col.,
384 Mass. 659, 660, 429 N.E.2d 21, 22 (1980)).
214r

'The

.

.

^'^lll

Cal. App.

^^^Id.

at 447-48,

.

.

3d 443,

168 Cal

168 Cal. Rptr.

.

Rptr.
at 724.

722

(1980).
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held that the longevity of the employee's service could
provide

a

basis for finding

faith and fair dealing.

^^'^

a

violation of the duty of good

The court focused on Cleary's

eighteen years of apparently satisfactory performance as
the basis for an implied-in law requirement that employers

can discharge long-term employees only in good faith. ^'^
As to the proper remedy,

the New Hampshire court in

Monge rejected damages for pain and suffering. ^^^

The

Cleary court, however, stated that the employer's breach of
the covenant "sounded in both contract and in tort"^^° and

that

"

[the discharged employee]

will then be entitled to an

award of compensatory damages, and in addition, punitive

damages if his proof complies with the reguirements for
[punitive]

damages.

"^^^

of Montana Insurance

^^'^Id.

at 455,

The Montana court in Gates

Co.,^'^^

v.

Life

while rejecting the plaintiff's

168 Cal. Rptr.

at 729.

supra note 22, at 655 (noting while
longevity of service, by itself provides a basis for
finding a violation of "the duty of good faith and fair
dealing", the promulgation of a handboolc policy is evidence
of the employer's recognition of such an obligation).
^'^Leonard,

2i^Monge,

^^°Cleary,

114 N.H.

at 133,

316 A. 2d at 551.

111 Cal. App.3d at 456,

168 Cal. Rptr.

at

729.
221

Jd.

222196

Mont.

176,

638 P. 2d 1063

[hereinafter
205 Mont. 304, 668

(1982),

Gates I] appeal from decision on remand,
P. 2d 213 (1983) [hereinafter Gates II].
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express contract claim based on the handbook,

^^-^

found

that the employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing was

implied in the employment contract. ^^^
In Gates II,

the court held that the duty of good

faith and fair dealing was implied by law,
in addition to,

"apart from, and

any terms agreed to by the parties.

"^^^

The

breach of the duty sounds in tort and supports an award of
punitive damages if the employer acted with oppression,
or malice. ^^^

fraud,

2.

The Foley Decision

Several years later, the California Supreme Court

issued its long-awaited decision in Foley
Data Corporation.'^^'^

The court,

v.

Interactive

against the continuing

trend toward recognition of an award of tort damages,

refused to extend tort remedies to employment relationships

based on the duty of good faith and fair dealing. ^^^

Foley,

with over six years of satisfactory performance, was fired
after reporting to an another supervisor that his immediate

superior was under an FBI investigation for suspected

employer issued
plaintiff was hired.
^^^The

^^'Gates II,

668 P. 2d at 214.

j^^

22'47

(1988)

handbook two years after the

638 P. 2d at 1067.

^^^Gates I,

226

a

Cal.

3d 654,

254 Cal

.

228765

P. 2d.

at 396.

.

Rptr. 211,

765 P. 2d 373
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embezzlement

.^^^

Foley brought three causes of action

against his former employer:

alleging

a

(1)

a

tort cause of action

discharge in violation of public policy;

(2)

a

contract cause of action for breach of an implied-in-f act

promise to discharge only for good cause; and

(3)

a

tort

cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.

^"^^

Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that
"tort remedies are not available for breach of the implied

covenant in an employment contract to employees who allege
they have been discharge in violation of the covenant

"^"^^
.

The Foley court began its discussion of this issue by

addressing the distinction between contract and tort causes
The court emphasized the importance of predict-

of action.

ability of contract damages in the commercial system as
well as the purpose of contract damages to compensate the

injured party, rather than to punish the breaching party. ^^^

Recognizing the premise that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing applies to every contract, however,
the court suggested that since it is a contract term,

remedy for its breach should be limited to contract
remedies

.^^^

229765

P.

2d at 375

Jd.

at 374.

23ijd.

at 396.

232id.

at 389.

23°

233

Id.
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The court then distinguished the insurance cases,

where tort damages are allowed for breach of the implied
covenant,

from general employment contract cases.

The

court found that the "special relationship" between insurer
and insured^-^^ is not analogous to the relationship between

employer and employee.

The special relationship in

insurance contracts involves parties in unequal bargaining
positions, where one party is seeking security as opposed
to profit,

party.

^"^^

and the weaker party must trust the stronger
The court found these factors are not present to

the same degree in the employer-employee relationship.

^"^^

The court reached the conclusion based primarily on

three arguments.
to pay a claim,

First,
i.e.,

if an insurer in bad faith refuses

breaches the contract,

"the insured

cannot turn to the marketplace"^^"^ to obtain the same amount
of what he was deprived.

employee for

23^

Jd.

a

If an employer discharges an

bad reason, he still maintains the

at 390-91.

^^Various forms of insurer misconduct were identified
Among those cases, the court in Egan v. Mutual
as torts.
of Omaha Ins. Co. {24 Cal.3d 809 (1979)) emphasized that
"the relationship of insurer and insured is inherently
the adhesive nature of insurance contracts
unbalanced;

places the insurer in a superior bargining position. "( Jd.
This so-called "special relationship" model has
at 820)
been reiterated in the discussion of tort remedies in the
.

employment context.
^^^Id.
'''Id.

at 396.
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opportunity to seek alternative employment.

Second,

"the role of the employer differs from that of the 'quasi-

public'

insurance company with whom individuals contract

specifically in order to obtain protection from potential
specified economic harm."^^^

Third,

the interests of the

insurer and insured are always at odds.
makes

a

If the insured

valid claim, the insurer loses financially.

contrary,

On the

the employer's and employee's interests are

generally in alignment.

While the employer must pay the

employee for the work done, the employer receives the

benefit of the work in exchange for the payment. Since
"special relationship,
in insurance cases,

"

a

which gives rise to tort remedies

does not exist in employment relations,

the court judged that it was unnecessary to extend tort

remedies to discharged employees based on the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The question as to whether the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing is implied-in-law or implied-

in-fact is answered in the Foley decision.

The court

states that "an allegation of breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an allegation of

breach of an 'ex contracts' obligation, namely one arising
out of the contract itself.

The covenant of good faith is

read into contracts in order to protect the express

covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some

238

Id.
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general public policy interest not directly tied to the

contract's purposes
In Gates II,

"^^^
.

the existence of an employment contract

also led the dissenters to conclude that the employer's

breach of the covenant sounded in contract.
Judicial reluctance by the majority of courts to

extend the duty of good faith and fair dealing to the

employment context may derive from "the poor fit of
employment agreements with commercial contract doctrines"^^^
and from the contradiction that the covenant would impose
on at-will employers, who enjoy the right to fire employees

at-will,

i.e.,

in bad faith.

Even the decisions recognizing the duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment context leave questions
to be resolved,

including the nature and scope of its duty:

"[w]hen the duty applies, does it require discharges to be

made merely in subjective good faith?;

[o]r must an employ-

er have some objective good cause to fire an employee to

whom he owns the implied-in-law duty?"^^'

A narrow formula-

tion would only require the good faith duty, while the

broadest extension requires that the employer faithfully
discharge the employee based on "good cause."

In employ-

ment contract cases without written or oral implied job

security provisions, it is unlikely for the broadest
239765

P.

2d at 394.

supra note 22, at 656.
^'^^Kornblau, supra note 68, at 688
2^°Leonard,
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extension to have

a

prevailing effect.

good faith and fair dealing,

therefore,

The covenant of

remains only a

limited exception to the at-will doctrine.

.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSIONS REGARDING WHY AND HOW JOB SECURITY
SHOULD BE PROTECTED

Job security became a matter of increased concern for

unions, workers,

and society during the past decades.

The

trend may be traced back to Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967,^^^

and several "whistleblower" statutes,

all of which

protect certain groups of employees from retaliatory

discrimination or discharge by employers.

Common-law

development of the exceptions to the at-will doctrine,

a

doctrine that reflected the laissez fair economic philosophy,

also indicated increased recognition of fairness to

employees as good ethics in the workplace as well as good

business
The felt need to protect employees'

rights in the

workplace spurred courts to develop legal theories and
remedies.
security,

The Wooley court,

clearly states that "[w]ages, promotions, condi-

tions of work, hours of work,

place to job security,

^^^5ee

recognizing importance of job

all of those take second

for without that all other benefits

supra note 2-3 and accompanying text.
76

.
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are vulnerable

"^^^
.

The court goes on to explain that job

security is the assurance of the employee's livelihood and
of the employer's family'

future, which thus will not be

destroyed arbitrarily by the employer without just cause. ^"^
"Discharge" is indeed labeled as the capital punish-

ment of the industrial world.

The issue of job security

has been addressed with increased frequency by indus-

trialized countries in the post World War II period.

^"^^

The

International Labor Organization recommended at the

conventions in 1963 and particularly in 1982 that workers
not be terminated except for good cause. ^^^
Today,

about 61 countries around the world provide

workers with protection against unfair discharge by
statutes or through some other measures. ^^'

For example,

in

Britain, protection against "unfair" discharge is provided

by legislation, as is also true in Sweden.

In Germany,

dismissals may only be instituted where their causes belong
to one of the socially warranted exceptions listed in the

^"^^Woolley,

491 A. 2d at 1266.

supra note 8, at 28.
^^^Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
employer, International Labour Conference, 68th Session,
2^^Gould IV,

Reports V(l)

&

(2)

(1982)

Unjust
A Seed Germinates :
Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 56,
^'''^Theodore

68

(1988)

.

J.

St. Antoine,

Act on Dismissal Protection of 1951.^^^

In Japan,

there is no wrongful discharge legislation,

where

the Civil Code

prohibits both disciplinary and economic discharges which
constitute an "abuse" of power.

^'*^

As opposed to the

universal appeal of job security, the United States remains
the last major industrial country that has not heeded the

call for an overall unjust discharge reform. ^^°

Abandonment of the at-will presumption has been
advocated by

a

number of legal scholars and judges.

This

Comment also supports the argument that the at-will

doctrine must be abandoned in order to secure job security
for employees in the workplace.

This is not to state that

all discretion employers possess in making decisions

regarding discharge should be limited.

This is to argue

against any rationale that suggests the at-will doctrine is
the substantive backgroud rule of law.

A.

Reasons for /Abandoning the At-Will Doctrine

1.

Socioeconomic Justifications
The employment-at-will doctrine was a creature of an

era in which the primary function of the common law was to

promote industrial growth.

2^^The

Employment-at-will was

Act has been amended for several times.

also, M. Weiss,

Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the Federal

Republic of Germany 3 9-103

24^Sugeno,

^^°Antoine,

See

K.,

(1987).

Labour Law,

2nd ed. 343-63,

supra note 247,

,

at 68.

1990.
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appropriate for nineteenth-century 7\merica in that the
doctrine giving employers total freedom to discharge
employees at-will served evidentiary purposes to protect

developing industry and the capitalist's investment.
The doctrine is not appropriate for the 1990 's,

in

which sophisticated American businesses should no longer

need judicial protection at the expense of justice and
fairness to employees in the workplace.

The promotion of

industrial capitalism by the courts has already been
achieved.

The California court in Cieary notes that "when

viewed in the context of present-day economic reality and
the joint reasonable expectations of employers and their

employees,

the 'freedom' bestowed by [the at-will doctrine]

may indeed be fictional

"^"^
.

As commentators argue that the at-will rule is

incompatible with the realities of modern economics and
employment practices, the economic and socioeconomic

justifications for the rule no longer exist.

Calling for

abandonment of the at-will rule and adaption of

rule more

a

protective of employee interests in job security is
consistent with the trend toward justice in the workplace
and the tendency of the courts' recognition of various

exceptions to the doctrine.

^'^Cleary,

at 725.

111 Cal. App

.

3d at 449-50,

168 Cal

.

Rptr.
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2.

Justifications Against Economic Arguments

A primary purpose of private companies
of profits.

is the pursuit

Based on that premise, employers enjoy

flexibility in job arrangements so that business will not
lose out in "competitiveness" in the market.

But abandon-

ment of the at-will presumption requires only fairness and
job security for employees in the workplace; it does not

require keeping unproductive employees.
will presumption,

Without the at-

employers can still enjoy the right to

discharge employees through reasonable procedures and just
cause standards.

Employees, on the other hand, would still

have to meet reasonable standards of performance if they

expect to be guaranteed continued employment.
Job security under the Japanese system has been often

referred to as "lifetime" employment.

It should be noted

that lifetime employment does not mean, however,

that all

employees are guaranteed continued employment until their

retirement age.

It merely means that employers'

discre-

tion to terminate employees are strongly limited by the
"abuse of power" test.

Japanese employers usually make

utmost efforts to keep employees, through such measures as
shukkd^'^^

(temporary transfer to a subsidiary firm)

rotation during an economic slump.

,

and job

^''"^

so-called shukko or temporary transfer is one
The origin of this
of the Japanese employment practices.
It was widely
system goes back to the pre-war period.
prevalent in private enterprises after the end of World War
^^^This
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As to job performance of employees,

ployers have

a

Japanese em-

strong incentive to improve the quality of

their hiring process, management, and supervision of their

workforces.

It should be noted that the employers are not

forced to keep unproductive employees; an employer's

discharge decisions may be sustained when dismissals are

based on "just cause," not on the "abuse of power."

That

most of the industrialized countries have already provided
some measures of job security through legislation or

standard practice proves that the abandonment of the atwill rule would not be detrimental to profitability and

competitiveness of American businesses.

Another economic argument in support of maintaining
the at-will doctrine is that "[t]o extend job security to

nonunionized private employments, however, would be to make
all the wider the chasm between employment and unemployment,

and to make more difficult entry into protected employments."^"''

Professor Power goes on to mention that "the

just cause rule would be an improvement in an era of

economic expansion, abundant job opportunities and near

Today many Japanese companies have a provision stating
that "company may order employee to transfer to a subsidiary company."
^^^Joji Akita, Employment Practices Versus Contract in
II.

Japanese Firms, 39 Syakairodokenkyu 322, 1992.
^^''Richard W. Power, A Defense of the Employment At
Will Rule, 27 St. Louis U.L.J. 881, 893 (1983).
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full employment

"^^^
.

He explains that job security,

particularly in an era of economic stagnation, becomes the
big hurdle which prevents even talented young people from

Amid recession, employers

entering into job markets. ^^^

under the at-will rule are likely to eliminate redundant

employees or employees whom they just dislike or think
unfit.

On the other hand,

they are unlikely to hire new

employees, which raises the unemployment rate and hence

makes the chasm between employment and unemployment wider.
If,

as he states,

employers discharged unfit employees and

instead hired new talented people, it would not be likely
that "[the discharged employees] will find employment more

suitable to their talents and temperaments elsewhere"^""^
under harsh economic conditions.

The argument that the

just cause rule would be inappropriate in an era of

economic slump is not persuasive at all.
Job security might be a major consideration as

distressed businesses try to make themselves leaner.

Even

in Japan where job security has been the hallmark of the

Japanese employment system,

a

growing number of companies

have moved to shed surplus workers.

The latest report from

the Japanese Labor Ministry says as many as 40 percent of

firms are making employment adjustments in one way or

255

j^^

2^^Jd.

'''Id.

at 894.

:
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another,

amid the worst recession of the post-war

period. ^^^
The right way to deal with redundant workers would be
to make better use of them,

not to get rid of them outright.

Where employers have to eliminate excess employees due to

economic reasons, the just cause rule should only allow
them to do so under certain circumstances

3.

.^^^

Benefit Justifications
The third argument in support of abandoning the at-

will rule is that the at-will premise allowing arbitrary

discharge creates severe emotional and financial hardships
for employees,

which is also detrimental to the long-run

success of a business.

Regarding effects of social and

emotional traumas due to discharge, one court stated as
follows

Every man's employment is of utmost
It occupies his
importance to him.
time, his talents, and his thoughts.
It controls his economic destiny.
It is the means by which he feeds his
family and provides for their security.
It bears upon his personal well-being,
In
his mental and physical health.
days gone by, a man's occupation
Even
literally gave him his name.
today, a continuous and asecure
Japan Times/ Monday Oct. 4, 1993 Editorial P18.
^^^This issue will be discussed in the following
2^^The

Chapter.
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employment contributes to a sense of
identity for most people. ^^°

Job security provides both employees and employers

with

a

multitude of benefits.^^'

Employees' expectations of

not being discharged arbitrarily and not being treated

unfairly in the workplace improve employee morale, satisfaction,

self-esteem and loyalty to the employer and also

foster "employee identification with the goals of the

enterprise

"^^^
.

The benefits from loyalty and the cost

savings from lower turnover improve productivity of the

company in the long run.

Some studies of worker partici-

pation projects prove the theory that productivity often
improves with increased job security and

employer-employee atmosphere .^^"^

Indeed,

a

cooperative

employees appre-

ciate their employers' efforts to eliminate wrongful

discharge and unfair treatment in the workplace.
Accordingly, the atmosphere becomes more favorable and

cooperative to the employer.

Incidentally,

job candidates

may find assurance of job security as an attractive factor
when deciding whether to accept employment.

Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 705,
389 Mich. 123, 205 N.W.2d 167 (1973).
^^^Clare Jully, Challenging the Employment -At -Will
^^°Lowe V.

Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory, 16
451-55.
^^^Minda,
^^^Note,

supra note 10, at 117 9.
supra note 9, at 1835 n.l02.

J. L. Reform 449,

)
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Some commentators have rejected the hypothesis that
job security actually may increase worker productivity and

efficiency by improving morale, loyalty and job satisarguing that no evidence that

faction,

a

system of just

cause dismissal would improve worker output has ever been

offered in support of "the satisfaction-productivity
hypothesis

"^^"^
.

According to their argument, job satis-

faction and motivation are different;

"[the former]

often

results from factors extrinsic to the job itself such as
pay,

benefits, or working conditions

[while the latter]

results chiefly from intrinsic factors such as responsirecognition,

bility,

involvement in decisionmaking, or

sense of achievement or self-esteem."

Thus,

a

regarding job

security as one of the extrinsic factors, they conclude
that job security cannot be relied on to motivate employees
to increase their productivity .^^^

This logic seems perfunctory. Job security provides

employees with material and morale benefits.

Job satis-

faction and motivation are not separable as in argument
above; employees who find their jobs responsible,

chal-

lenging or satisfactory to their self-esteem, would be

reasonably motivated to increase their productivity.

As

Just Cause for Termination Rules and
Economic Efficiency, 38 Emory L.J. 1097, 1132 (1989) (noting
that a close examination of the satisfaction-productivity
hypothesis demonstrates its many questionable assump^^'^Fred

tions

.

"

265

j^^

&

Polsby,
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such,

motivation is basically or partially derived from

job satisfaction.

Thus job security may be regarded as a

substantial element of job satisfaction, the same as pay,
various benefits or other working conditions.

It also

plays an important role in the workplace as it increases
the motivation of many workers who think their employers
are reliable.
The argument that "job satisfaction,

or morale,

virtually no causal impact on job performance,

"^^^

has

and thus

confers no economic benefits on the employer is not

persuasive at all.

Job security provides employees with

material and morale benefits, unlike the at-will premise
which always imposes

a

fear of being discharged arbitrarily

and being treated unfairly upon employees.
The leading defender of the at-will rule.

Epstein,

^^'

Professor

has argued that the employment at-will rule is

superior to all other alternatives because it is mutually

benef icial^^^ to the parties and consistent with the concept
of "freedom of contract

"^^^
.

His theory of mutual benefit

is based on the idea of symmetry.

He argues that the at-

will rule is fair because it respects the right of both the

employer and the employee to decide when the relation
should be terminated.

Professor Epstein's theory fails to

^^^Id.

at 1133.

^^"^See,

^^^Id.

Epstein, supra note 70
at 955-62.

^^^Id.

at 953-55.

.

account for the realities of the workplace in which

employers and employees have unequal bargaining power.

Congress rebutted the assumption of equal bargaining power

between employer and employee by enacting the National
Labor Relations Act.

The assumption of asymmetrical

bargaining power has dominated labor law for the last fifty
years and has also motivated courts to recognize several

exceptions to the at-will doctrine

.^"^"^

Thus,

the mutually

beneficial argument is anachronistic.
The concept of freedom of contract in the employment

relationship, rooted in feudalism and the laissez-fair
economy, has been drastically transformed by society's

recognition that "many aspects of the employment relation
have too many external ramifications to be left entirely to
a

private bargain between an employer and an individual

employee

"^'^'
.

Thus the argument is also inconsistent with

the history of employment law, which has witnessed the

circumscription of freedom of contract in the employment
relationship
Today,

the majority of state courts recognize tort-

and contract-law exceptions to the at-will premise,
state, Montana,

has replaced the doctrine with a general

just cause dismissal statute.

An increasing volume of

wrongful discharge litigation brought by arbitrarily

supra note 10, at 1170 n.ll6
^''^Leonard, supra note 22, at 675.
^'°Minda,

and one

discharged employees reflects today's American society;
more and more employees' expectations of job security

continue to expand, as does the growing recognition of how
unjust discharge affects economic well-being and causes

psychological harm.
Now is the time to call for abolition of the at-will

doctrine supported by the social, economy, and moral
rationales and to provide comprehensive legal protection
against unjust discharge for all employees,

including those

who are note protected by collective bargaining agreements
or by anti-discrimination legislation,

civil service, or

teacher tenure arrangements.

B.

Search for the Best Way to Provide Job Security

Commentators opposed to the at-will doctrine have been
confronting another issue.

What would be,

then,

the best

solution to replace the doctrine: increased unionization to

negotiate collective agreements on their behalf; increasing
the existing common law exceptions to the at-will premise;
or adopting state or federal just cause dismissal statutes?

Although each of these solutions has its own limitations
and effects,

this article finds unionism and judicially

created exceptions to the at-will rule inadequate to
protect aii American workers from wrongful discharge.
advocates that the third type of solution;

i

.

e .,

This

legislation

proscribing all discharges without just cause. Particularly,

.

.
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comprehenseive federal legislation is the appropriate
remedy for the issue of wrongful discharge.

1.

Unions
Labor unions have succeeded in obtaining

a

just cause

standard for employment discharge in most collective

bargaining agreements

.^"^^

Thus,

unionized employees in the

private sector are shielded from unjust discharge by
collective bargaining agreements and are protected much
more than nonunionized employees.

The reality is,

however,

that such agreements cover only a small portion of the work
force due to the declining union penetration.

Unions

represent less than twenty percent of American workers,

which is the lowest level since the end of World War II.
There are some commentators who advocate that employees wishing to obtain meaningful protection from unjust

dismissal must look primarily to the collective bargaining
process, not to judicial or legislative action to change
the at-will

According to this argument, the

rule.^'^'^

problem of job security is so amenable to private provision

labor Law 701-02 (10th ed.
1986); 2 Collective Bargaining Negot, & Cont (BNA) §40:1, §
51:1 (1986) (the just cause standard and greivance/ arbitration procedures found in 94% and 97-100% of contracts
^^^A.Cox.D.Bok

&

Gorman,

sampled respectively)
^'''^Susan

L.

Catler,

The Case Against Proposals to

Eliminate the Employment At Will Rule,
(1983)

5

Indus .Rel. L. J.

471

90

that government regulation should be limited to ensuring

judicial recognition of

a

public policy exception and to

facilitating bargaining procedures

.^'^'^

The argument con-

cludes that employees could insure continued job security

by organizing themselves if they valued job security
highly.

^^"^

those who could be protected through

Thus,

organization do not need legislative or judicial modification of the at-will

Theoretically, the primary

rule.^"^^

purpose of collective bargaining was to protect individual employee rights,

giving employees

a

achieving industrial democracy by

voice in influential decisions in their

lives and minimizing governmental and judicial interventions.^'^''

The purposes themselves were sound and were

achieved when the interests protected were primarily
economic, which were common to everyone.

A limitation of collective bargainings exists, however,
in that an individual employee cannot enjoy the benefits of

collective bargaining unless
employees
tation.

a

majority of his fellow

share the same desire for collective represenTo be sure,

collective agreements have established

not only wage rates but also other defined rights of

employees in the work place.

Collective bargaining really

functions where the majority of employees desire equivalent

"^Catler,

supra note 273,

at 521.

supra note 27,

at 8-11

'''Id.
'''Id.

^''"^Summers,

.
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protection, regardless of economic or non-economic
interests.

As interests of workers extended to more

personal, non-economic interests such as the rights of
privacy, personal dignity,
rity,

^'^^

fairness,

and physical integ-

the felt need to protect such individual employees'

rights in the workplace spurred courts and legislatures to

develop new remedies for employees.

As a result, protec-

tion by collective bargaining became less attractive.
This decreasing reliance on collective bargaining

means that more than 801 of private American workers are
not covered by collective bargaining agreements.

decline of unionization seems to be continuing.
of the disappointing reality,

The

^"^^

In light

collective bargaining, with

its arbitration and grievance procedure, may be a sound way
to achieve worker protection from unjust dismissal but

fails to function as an effective instrument for protecting

individual employee job security for most American

workers

2

.

.^^°

Common Law

at 15.

2^«Id.

^'^^ichell.

301,

319

The Changing American Workplace,

The Lab.

Law.

(1985)

Japanese manegerial and supervisory
employees who have not been covered by collective
bargaining agreements are willing to organize themselves in
order to protect their employment., Takenori Inoki, Nihhon^^"interestingly,

Keizai Times,

March 29. 1993.
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If collective bargaining does not fully protect

private employees, the law will find other ways to protect
Some commentators believe that the judiciary holds

them.

the best promise for doing away with the at-will doc-

Professor Blades urges courts to develop tort

trine. ^^^

theories for "abusive" discharge.

employee [should have]

a

"[T]he

aff[ected]

personal remedy for any damage he

suffers when discharged as a result of resisting his

employer's attempt to intimidate or coerce him in

a

way

which bears no reasonable relationship to the employment.

"^^^

In keeping with the tort formulation of this

cause of action, he suggests punitive damages would be

available to aggrieved employees

.^^~^

Professor Leonard urges courts to construct

a

new

common-law presumption that would more accurately reflect
the contemporary employment law setting. ^^^

tion places a great deal of emphasis,
in present handbook-as-contract cases,

This presump-

far more than found

on circumstances

that exist when employees enter into the employment

relationship.

If the parties have expressed themselves on

the issue of a continuing relationship during the hiring

process,

courts should presume that the relation is not at

2^^Leonard,
J. OF L.

Reform.,

supra note 22,

at 680-83

(N.C.),

333.

supra note 37, at 1413 n.4.
^^^Id. at 1427.
^^Leonard, supra note 22, at 680.
^^^Blades,

and see 16
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"The more care the employer puts into the hiring

will.

such as interviewing,

process,

checking references,

administering preemployment physical examinations, and
specifying

a

probationary period, the more logical would be

the presumption that the employer and the employee expected
the relationship to be extended.

"^^^

When the employer has made an express promise by

providing
provision,
fact.^^^

a

printed policy manual including

a

just-cause

the presumption is even more soundly based in

If the parties have not expressed themselves on

the subject during the hiring process,

courts should

presume the employment relationship to be open-ended,
unless the job does not exist or the employee proves

unsuitable for the

He notes that it is reasonable

job.^^"^

to acknowledge that deferred compensation such as health

care and retirement benefits,

benefits are included in

a

and holiday and vacation

relationship presumed to be of

indefinite duration, and terminable only for just cause. ^^^
His theory is primarily based on the indicia of the

unspoken understanding that the parties expect their
relationship to be continuous so long as the job is

satisfactorily performed.

^^'"Id.
286

at 681

j^_

^^'Id.

at 682

^^^Id.

at 681

.

.
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Professor Blackburn's proposal is similar to that
of Professor Leonard,

proper way for change.

advocating contract formation as the
He urges courts to cease inferring

that parties intend employment to be terminable at will.^^^
He states that "[i]n the absence of information on what

employers and prospective employees expect
into an employment relationship,

when they enter

courts should presume that

each expects the relationship to continue as long as the

employee adequately performs the job."^^°

Incidentally, he

also suggests that it is necessary to redefine the issue of
oral employment contracts.

The new presumption of extended

employment, however, would be easily avoided if an employer

offers during the hiring process the express contract that
the employment relationship can be terminated at the will
of either party at any time without notice and explanation.

The current common law exceptions to the at-will

doctrine provide employees with less than uniform and sufficient protection against wrongful discharge.

Public

policy exceptions are applicable generally when public
health and safety violations are involved.

The public

policy exception may also be unavailable to lower-level

Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A
Changing Concept of Employment At Will, 17 Am. Bus. L.J.
^^^Blackburn,

467

(1980)

Murray, Protection Against Unjust
the Need for a Federal Statute, 16 J. of L.

^^°Stieber

Discharge:
Reform 319,

333

&

(1983)
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employees who tend to lack access to information that
allow them to blow the whistle on their superiors.
Implied contract exceptions are applicable only when

employees have received express or implied promises of job
security.

In reality,

however,

employers are certainly

free not to issue employee handbooks containing

a

just-

cause provision and also are free to issue personnel

manuals that clearly tell that the manual is not part of
the employment contract.

In states still adhering to the

traditional bilateral contract doctrine, company policies
in the handbook are unlikely to be recognized as the

employment contract.

The covenant of good faith and fair

dealing has provided the least protection for discharged
employees.

These exceptions do not go far enough.

The courts'

ability to effect evolutions in the tort-

and contract law has been evident.

It is unlikely,

however,

that the courts are in fact moving toward adoption of such

new common law presumptions and recognition of tort liability against unfair termination. ^^^

Both employers and

employees do not want the complicated and complex array of

statutory and common-law exceptions to the at-will doctrine.
Some specialized legislation will ultimately be necessary
for employees to be fully and effectively protected against

wrongful discharge.

California Supreme Court limited damage awards
in cases over a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
^^^The
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3.

Legislation
Professor Clyde Summers advocated comprehensive unfair

dismissal legislation as early as eighteen years

ago.^^^

Noting that major industrial countries abroad recognized at
least some measure of job security, he concluded that

society should provide legal protection of employees' job

security by statute, in the most concrete fashion possible,

including just cause clauses as in collective bargaining
agreements

.^^"^

A number of commentators agree that just

cause legislation is desirable

.^^^

Proponents of legislation must face the issue of union
reaction; what would unions think about such
has been

a

a

statute?

It

common assumption that most of unions would not

favor legislation protecting employees against wrongful

discharge because it would dilute the incentive for
employees to organize.

One of the selling points that

union organizers can offer to employees is protection
against arbitrary dismissal.
Now,

With

a

unions are beginning to support such statutes.

just-cause requirement generally applicable, it will

be far more difficult for employers to fire employees,

including union organizers and union sympathizers because
employers would have to show that some reasonable.
supra note 12.

^^^Summers,
^^'-^Id.

at 532.

^^^Stieber

&

Murray,

Supra note 290

.
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acceptable bases other than unjust cause prohibited by
the National Labor Relations Act existed for the dis-

The AFL-CIO's Executive Council has discarded

charge. ^^°

its long-standing ambivalence toward proposals for wrongful

discharge statutes. ^^^
There are other signs supporting the idea that legis-

lation will ultimately be needed.

Bills forbidding wrong-

ful discharge have been introduced in about a dozen state
legislatures.^^'''

are similar.

Most of the proposed unjust dismissal laws

They typically require good or just cause for

dismissal, while limiting employer liability by requiring

arbitration rather than jury trials and by limiting damages
suffering,

for pain,

damages

emotional distress or punitive

.^^^

Employers, who are well organized politically and are

influential in legislative assemblies, historically have

opposed any judicial or legislative action restricting
their employment practices and discretion.

However,

the

continued growth in common-law liability, particularly in

^^^Summers,
23*^1

supra note 12.

Lab. Rel. Rep.

(BNA)

,

Mar.

3,

1987 at

1.

Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virgin
See, Summer, supra n.l4
Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
at 58, see also, Krueger, supra note 41, at 650-60
^^'^California,

(characteristics of proposed unjust-dismissal laws are
included)
^^^Krueger, Supra note 41.
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tort liability,

for wrongful discharge probably have

swollen the uncertainty and expense that employers bear in
common law unjust-dismissal suits, which could shift the
employers' preference toward legislation of an appropriate

Legislation becomes an attractive alternative for

form.^^^

employers when it would limit the size of damage awards and
reduce the uncertainty in unjust-dismissal suits. Business
groups may come to support such proposed unjust-dismissal
statutes. ^°°

Nonunionized employees would benefit most from such
unjust dismissal laws, though some of them might lose

opportunities to receive large potential damage awards,
since wrongful dismissal legislation would most likely

include

a

cap on damages.

It can be said that such laws

are a kind of compromise between limited employer lia-

bility and assumption of fault.

299

"^"^

LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law
and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A New
Order Begins, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 94, 108-09 (1990) ("[pjrior to
1987, the case-law development from Gates I to Crenshaw
generated a belief among Montana employers and insurance
companies who paid the damages for many employment tort
actions that their best hope for changing the direction of
the law was through direct legislative action.")
^'^^Krueger ^ supra note 41.
See also, Stieber & Baines, supra note
^°^Id. at 651.
Listing a form of compromise, they state
290, at 176-77.
that any bill must represent a compromise among various
interest groups such as employers, defense bar, trade
unions, plaintiff bar, non-union employees and academic
See, e.g.,

.
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Montana became the first state to enact

a

compre-

hensive law protecting employees against wrongful discharge,
the "Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act" (WDFEA)

July 1987. 3°2

,

in

legislative history of this statute

^j^g

originates from the uncertain contours of common law prior
to its enactment.

Having recognized the possibility of

a

wrongful discharge action and thus partly rejecting the

previously dominant presumption of at-will employment, the
Montana court first implied

a

covenant of good faith and

fair dealing in employment contracts in Gates

1^°^

and

declared the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as
11.^°^

tort rather than a contract action in Gates

a

In Nye

v.

Department of Livestock,

^^"^

the court gave a

broad sweep to the public policy tort of wrongful discharge.
In Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing,'^^^ the court

extended the covenant to employees who had received oral or

unintended objective manifestations by the employer of job
The court also mentioned that neither a

security .^°'^

lawyers. Job security is for many of our citizens one of
their most valued rights.
^"^Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-901 to 914 (1989).
^^^Gate V. Life of Montana Insurance Co., 196 Mont. 178,
638 P. 2d 1063
^^^Id.,

213

(1988)

.

appeal after remand,

205 Mont.

(1983)
305196

Mont. 222,

639 P. 2d 498

306212

Mont. 274,

687 P. 2d 1015

3o^Jd.

at 282,

(1982).

687 P. 2d at 1020.

(1984).

304,

668 P. 2d

.
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statute nor

a

regulation was necessary as

a

prerequisite

for a wrongful discharge action found on public policy.

^^"^

Particularly from 1982 through 1985, the Montana
Supreme Court steadily expanded the grounds for wrongful

discharge suits and extended the good faith obligation to
all employment contracts,

along with tort remedies

."^"^

If a majority of the justices was unsatisfied with the

developing state of the law but was unwilling to reverse
such decisions as Gates I

II,

&

Dare,

and Flanigan,

their

anxiety was swept away by the subsequent enactment of

wrongful dismissal legislation which prevented the court
As such, Montana employers and

from going further.

insurance companies, who had paid the damages for

employment tort actions, supported the bill, and this
support was followed by enactment.
Finally,

in August of 1991,

the National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the "Model
Employment Termination Act,

"

which would provide protection

for employees against wrongful discharge in states still

adhering to the at-will rule, but which would sharply limit
the damages recoverable.

The adoption of a Model Act is

considered a starting point for legislative action.

^^^Id.

at 280,

687 P. 2d at 1019.

Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association, 720 P. 2d 257 (Mont), appeal dismissed, 107
S.Ct. 564 (1986) (upholding an award of $1.4 million in
punitive damages to a thirty-year employee)
^^^E.g.,

Flanigan

v.

101

4.

Proposal for Federal Legislation
The developments noted above indicate a growing

tendency among the states toward broader protection against
unjust discharge.

Again,

an explosion of various employ-

ment statutes prohibiting employers' unfair dismissal

practices also indicates that both federal and state
governments consider the employement relationship deserving
of sustained intervention.

-^'^

unjust dismissal legislation.

The time is now ripe for

Particularly, this papaer

advocates federal legislation is the appropriate remedy.

~^^'

Federal legislation is the best approach because

wrongful discharge is

a

problem common to every state.

Since protection of jobs is commonly important to all

workers in the United States,

state legislation on a state-

by-state basis against unjust dismissal would be often

inadequately enforced.

A federal statute applying

uniformly to the entire country and providing uniform
standards would probably be the best approach.
At the same time,

^^^^

state legislation seems more likely

to be enacted in states other than Montana in the near

^'"Elisabeth C.

Doctrine,

Brandon,

15 Hastings Const.

L.

The Employment At Will
Q.

359,

380

(1988)

.

full consideration of underlying issues of federal
legislation, such as preemption problems of wrongful
^^'a

discharge claims, is far beyond the scope of this paper.
^^^See Stieber & Murray, supra note 290, at 336 ("The
appropriate remedy for the problem of unjust discharge is
comprehensive federal legislation").
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future.

It may be easier to persuade some progressive

state legislatures to break new ground in this area,

and

such state legislation would be meaningful because

"[ejnacting such legislation on

a

state-by-state basis

would permit the variety and experimentation that is

necessary to test new legislation before introducing it
into the federal system.

"^^^

Although comprehensive federal

legislation is the appropriate long-term remedy for the

problem of wrongful discharge, state legislative efforts
are important as well.

'^^^Id.

n.4)

.

at 336

(citing Summers,

supra note 12,

at 521

CHAPTER V
GOOD CAUSE LEGISLATION

Part IV concluded that a comprehensive federal statute
is the most appropriate remedy for the problem of unjust

discharge and the most preferable vehicle for achieving
reform.
The "Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act" enacted
in Montana

(hereinafter as the Montana Act), the Model

Employment Termination Act adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws

and the bills introduced in

after as the Model Act),

several state legislatures in the

many respects.

(herein-

1980s''^^'^

are similar in

Most of the laws provide that discharge

must be for "good cause,

"

encourage resort to arbitration

rather than to jury trials, and frequently allow reinstatement with back pay, which is typically unavailable under
the common law.

Proponents of such wrongful dismissal legislation
confront

number of considerations to be taken into

a

accounts such as the "good cause" standard, dispute

California, 1986 [SB 1827], Colorado, 1981 [HB
1495], Michigan, 1982 [HB 5892], Pennsylvania, 1981 [HB
1742], Vermont, 1988 [SB 299], Washington, 1987 [HB 1133],
'^'^E.g.

Wisconsin,

,

1981 etc.
103

.
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procedures, remedies, and employer and employee coverage.
In an attempt to offer an appropriate comprehensive

legislative scheme, the remainder of this Article discusses
such considerations by analyzing the prevalence of good

cause/arbitration models among the proposed and enacted
laws

A.

The Good Cause Standard

A major feature of the Montana Act
employment at-will with

a

is that it replaces

good cause standard requiring

employers to have "good cause" to discharge an employee.

Under the Montana Act,

a discharge'^^^ is

wrongful if:

(1)

it was in retaliation for refusal to violate public policy

or for reporting a violation of public policy;

it was

(2)

not for good cause and the employee had completed the

employer's probationary employment period; or

(3)

the

employer violated express provisions of its own personnel
policy. ^^^
As noted above,

the Act states that a wrongful

discharge can arise in three different ways. It is an
example of the shift in employers' perceptions of what was

^^''"Discharge"

is defined as any termination of

employment including resignition, elimination of the job,
lay off or lack of work, failure to recall or rehire, and
any other cutback in the number of employees for a
legitimate business reason. Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-903
(2)

(1989)

.

^^'^ont

CA 39-2-904.

"

.
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an acceptable public policy on employee discharges

.^''^

The Act also acknowledges the prevalence of express

contract exceptions under today's common law. The legislature expanded protections against wrongful discharge to

cover more employees by imposing a good cause duty on

employers

Modeled after the Montana Act, the Model Act also
adopted the good cause standard, providing that "an
employer may not terminate the employment of an employee

without good cause.

""^^^

The language of the provisions

found in the bills proposed in several state legislatures
is identical to that of the Model Act.'^^^

1.

Definitions of "Good Cause"
What is "Good Cause" is a substantive issue to be

discussed.

It is certainly a critical term.

Under the

Montana Act, the definition of good cause is "reasonable

Act prohibits discharges against public policy,
("Public
although public policy is defined narrowly.
policy " is defined as a policy in effect at the time of
the discharge concerning the public health, safety, or
welfare established by constitutional provision, statute,
Mont CA 39-2-903(7)).
or administrative rule.
^^^The Model Employment Termination Act, Section 3
^^"^The

(a)

(1991)

.

'^^^E.g.,

"An employer shall not discharge an employee

except for just cause," Michigan, 1982 [HB 5892], and "a
discharge is wrongful if it is not for good cause,
California, 1986 [SB 28001].
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job-related grounds for dismissal based on

a

failure to

satisfactorily perform job duties disruption of the
employer's operation, or other legitimate business
reasons.
(i)

a

"^^°

The Model Act defines "good cause" as follows:

reasonable basis related to an individual employee

for termination of the employee's employment in view of

relevant factors and circumstances, which may include the

employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct
otherwise)
(ii)

,

job performance,

(on the job or

and employment record; or

the exercise of business judgment in good faith by the

employer,

including setting its economic or institutional

goals and determining methods to achieve those goals,

organizing or reorganizing operations, discontinuing,
consolidating, or divesting operations or positions or
parts of operations or positions, determining the size of
its work force and the nature of the position filled by its

work force, and determining and changing standards of

performance for positions

""^^^
.

Although the definition of good cause in the Model Act
seems reasonably more specific than that in the Montana Act,

both definitions embody the same idea that good cause as
the basis for termination or discharge of employees in-

cludes both causes related to the individual employee and

legitimate business or economic reasons.

320Mont
^^^The

CA 39-2-903 (5)
Model Employment Termination Act, Section 1(4).
.

.
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2.

Individual Causes and Business Reasons

a.

Individual Causes

According to the good cause statute of Montana, an
employer may discharge an employee for his unsatisfactory

performance on the job. An underlying rationale of the

provision may be the understanding of both parties in the
employment relationship that the employer must pay the

agreed wages and benefits while the employee must do
"satisfactory" work in return.

-^^^

"Satisfactory" work or

job performance is obviously not a precise concept.

It may

vary from employers to employers.
For instance.

Professor Abrams and Professor Nolan

note that "satisfactory" work in the employment context has
four elements:

"(1)

regular attendance,

reasonable work rules,
of work,

and

(3) a

(2)

obedience to

reasonable quantity and quality

avoidance of any conduct that would

(4)

interfere with the employer's ability to operate the

business successfully

"'^^'^
.

An employee's failure to meet

these obligations will justify discipline

.^^^

Regular attendance is the most fundamental duty for
employees.

Excessive absenteeism and tardiness are likely

to constitute good cause because such conduct is likely to

^^^Abrams

&

Nolan,

Employee Discipline Cases,
(1985)
'''Id.
'''Id.

at 597.

Theory of "Just Cause" in
1985 Duke L. J. 594, at 598-99

Toward

a
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lead to inadequate performance of the job as well as

interf erring with the order of the workplace

."^^^

Regular attendance is not necessarily an absolute

obligation for employees.
reason,

Where absences are for

a

good

such as a pattern of absenteeism based on an

industrial injury, and are unlikely to continue in the
future,

discharge may be found unreasonable ."^^^

Employee conduct violating work rules also constitutes
"good cause" for a termination.'^^'^

Work rules regulate

employee conduct in order to maintain the safety and order
of the workplace and maximize the productivity of the

Violation of reasonable work rules is a

company.

legitimate cause for discipline .'^^^

In this instance,

the

rules must be legitimate.

Inadequate performance,

incompetence, and neglect of

work may deserve discipline if the standards of evaluation
used by the employer are reasonable.

The good cause

standard in lieu of at-will employment is not to protect

unproductive workers nor does it guarantee continued
(Arbitrators tend to uphold
note 322, at 613.
dismissals where an employee is tardy or absent more than
other employees and is likely to continue indifferently in
the future regardless of repeated warning. Id.).
^^^Supra

at 614.

^^^Id.

^^'''Examples

of "good cause" under this category include

conducts such as assault, theft, fighting on the job,
destruction of property, or use of drugs or alcohol on the
job [Id.)
'^'^^Id.
at 614-15.
.
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employment to an employee.

Management can discipline or

discharge an employee who is incapable of performing his
job or who neglects his duties in its pursuit of produc-

tivity.

Insubordination has been
discharge.

-^^^

a

well-recognized ground for

It is taken for granted that employees have

duties to follow rules or instructions and to be loyal to
their employer's interests.

an intentional refusal

Thus,

to follow orders without a reasonable excuse constitutes

good cause for discharge

.'^'^°

In the determination of good cause for a termination

because of insubordination, however, the reasonableness of
a

company order refused or rejected should be considered.

There are

a

number of possible defenses that

raise depending on the circumstances.

a

grievant can

The employee's

refusal to comply with an order on grounds that it is
unsafe, unreasonable,

illegal,

or immoral may be excused.

"When an employee can establish that there has either

been actual past harm incurred in

a

particular assignment

or that a reasonable person would have feared for life,
limb,

"'*'*'

or property,

a

discipline offered by terminating

the employee is likely to be regarded as abusive.

supra note 81, at 127.
^^^Circle Security Agency, Inc. v. Ross, 107 111. App.
3d 195, 437 N.E.2d 667 (1982); Deason v. Mobil Oil Co., 407
App. 1981).
So. 2d 486 (La. Ct
^^^Holloway

&

Leech,

.

^"^^Fortado,

Work Assignment

Refusal to Accept a
How Arbitrators Rule in Discharge Cases,

Travis,
:

&

Jennings,
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The simple spectre of health and safety does not

itself excuse an employee's refusal to accept

assignment

.^^^

a

work

Arbitrators would only regard an assign-

ment's inappropriateness if it repeatedly affected the

health conditions of other workers in the past and the
refusal by the employee is exactly based on such circumstances

.

Occasionally, however, employees may be discharged for
their health.

In Stowe-woodward

Co.,^'^^

for example,

an

arbitrator concluded that the employee was discharged

because he was unable to work in the plant because of his
severe asthmatic reaction to the work environment,

health,

contending that "an employer has the right to expect an
employee to be available for work with reasonable regularity.

"^^'^

Other reasons such as those of religion and morality
"are also common employee defenses for their refusal of

work assignment but [they] are difficult to establish to an

arbitrator's satisfaction.

"^^^

The tendency of arbitrators

to sustain discharges or some other disciplines indicate

that these defenses are often regarded as flimsy.

16 Employee Rel.
^^^Id.
^^^78

L.

205,

J.

Inc.,

81

(1990)

.

at 209.

Lab. Arb.

(BNA) 1038

^^Vortado et al.,
^^^Id. at 209-10.
Lab. Arb.

208

(BNA) 1059

Lab. Arb.

(

(1982) (Thompson Arb

.

)

.

supra note 331, at 209.
(E.g., Centreville Clinics, Inc.,
1985) (Talarico Arb.);

(BNA)

83

(1983),

Id.).

and Crucible,

85

Ill

Employee misconduct interfering with the operation

may include off-duty conduct.

Employee off-duty conduct

away from the workplace may be "good cause,

"

if it is

relevant to the employer's successful operation, to

business reputation or to similar concerns.

Some off-duty

misconduct violating no work rule may sometimes warrant
discipline if the conduct raises serious doubt as to his
future trustworthiness,

tarnishes the company's reputation,

and jeopardizes the business image.

~^'^^

However, off-duty activity of the employee bearing no

reasonable relationship to the employee's job performance
and business reputation will not constitute just cause.
Thus,

the employer must demonstrate a nexus with its

business needs.

The most careful evaluation by employers

in order to avoid overreaction on unfounded fears is also

needed.

b.

^'^''

Economic and Business Grounds
Dismissals that are part of large-scale coordinated

layoffs necessitating economic downturns have been

generally viewed as valid. The Model Act defines that the
exercise of business judgment, including setting its

economic or institutional goals and determining methods to
achieve those goals and the size and composition of the

336

Nolan,
at 616-17

'Abrams

'^^'^Id.

&

supra note 322,

at 616.
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work force by the employer, constitutes "good cause."
The Montana court formulated its own definition of the term
of "legitimate business reason" as follows:

legitimate business reason is a
reason that is neither false,
whimsical, arbitrary or capricious,
and it must have some logical
relationship to the needs of the
business.
In applying this definition, one must take into account the
right of an employer to exercise
discretion over who it will employ
and keep in employment.
Of equal
importance to this right, however, is
the legitimate interests of the
employee to secure employment .^^^
[a]

In light of the particular circumstances of each case

and a balancing of the employer'

maintaining

a

s

interest in operating and

business efficiently and profitably with the

employee's interest in maintaining employment, legitimate

economic or business reasons which require
force,

a

reduction in

such as a general recession and poor business, may

be offered by employers in defense of wrongful discharge

claims
It should be noted,

however,

that reductions in force

based on economic and business grounds per se do not
constitute good cause for discharge.

The employer's

decisions as to the economic goals and methodologies of the
^^^Buck V.

Mont. 276,

Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc.,

281-82,

811 P. 2d 537,

540

(1991).

24:
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enterprise and the size of the work force must be

governed by "honest business judgment ."
In the context of discharges based on economic and

business grounds, the employer's required fairness in
judgment would include three essential notions:
(1)

reasonableness of the employer's judgment;

fairness; and

(3)

(2

)

procedural

industrial consistent treatment among the

same group of employees.
The law would not necessarily require the employer to

prove layoffs or dismissals motivated by the employer's

economic situation be the only measures in order to protect

business in an economically hard situation.

It would be

enough that reasonable employers believe that the most
stringent form of discipline, e.g., layoffs, is needed to

protect the system of business and to get it going as

a

reasonable means in the circumstances.
The fact that a growing number of states and the

federal government have enacted plant closure legislation

which requires notification of closing information to be

provided to employees

,

or the award of severance benefits

to assist in relocation endorses the importance for employ-

ers to respond to procedural fairness including advance

notice to the employees in the context of economic or

collective dismissals.

Expanding notions of employer

liability for nondisclosure would be also important.
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Examples of legitimate grounds for selecting

a

particular employee for layoff include the employee's past

performance on the job, attendance record, seniority, etc.
An individual employee may still contest his selection
for layoff on the grounds that it was discriminatory under

certain federal, state, or local discrimination laws or

established public policy.
Economic motivations for cutbacks in the work force
have been generally viewed as supplying the requirement of
just cause because an employer's decision as to the

economic goals and methodologies of the enterprise are

viewed as basic to the system of free enterprise.
during

a

recession, however,

Layoffs

are likely to be even more

devastating in terms of reemployment possibilities because
of the lack of jobs in other sectors.

Since economic and

business reasons for discharge are unrelated to the
employee's conduct or performance of the job, application
of the good faith standard in analyzing the legitimacy of

the collective discharges and in expansion of the employer

liability for nondisclosure in the exercise of business
judgment is also needed.

3.

Concepts of Good Cause: Subjective V. Objective
"Just cause" or "good cause" for termination connotes

a

fair and honest cause or reason regulated by good faith

.
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on the part of the employer. ^^^

The employer's good faith

belief in the existence of cause for an employee's
dismissal is the critical fact in many cases.
One case has held that good faith belief that good

cause existed was sufficient to justify discharge
court in Coombs

subjective

Gamer Shoe Co. seems to apply

v.

similar

a

The court stated that an employer may

test.^''^

terminate an employee as long as the employer gives
and honest reason.

The

.'^'*°

^''^

a

fair

This test is comparable to the good

faith requirement in the Uniform Commercial Code
that has generally been interpreted as imposing

(UCC)~^^'*

a

sub-

jective test which relies on motive instead of actual

knowledge
The employer'

s

good faith belief must focus on both

the employee's performance and assertions that if true

would amount to just cause.

The court in Sanders

v.

Parker

Drilling Company^'^ illustrates the question of whether the
employer need only show that he acted in good faith based
on the information available,

or if the employer must prove

See's Candies, Inc. (1st Dist) 116 Cal. App
3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, appeal after remand (1st Dist)
203 Cal. App. 3d 753, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195.
^^^Pugh

V.

^^^Simpson v.

1276

(1982)

.

Western Graphics, 293 Ore. 96,

.

^''^778

P.

^^^Id.

at 887.

2d 845

(Mont .)( 1989)

.

§1-201 (19) (1989)
^^911 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990).
^^^U.C.C.

.

643 P. 2d
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that the employee actually committed a wrongdoing.

This

is the issue of subjective and objective standards which

has been discussed in some wrongful discharge cases.

Under Alaska law,
answered:

two separate questions must be

whether employee actually engaged in conduct the

employer alleges, and whether that conduct constitutes good
cause for termination of employment

The court concluded

.'^^^

the employer must show the discharged employee engaged in

alleged prohibited conduct, an employer's subjective belief
that it possessed good cause is insufficient.
Indeed,

the actual facts of the case would become

insignificant if only the employer's mental state or
subjective state of mind mattered.

"^''^

It is odd that

employees could be fired based on their employer'
faith but nonetheless wholly mistaken beliefs.

s

good-

Application

of such a subjective test would reduce good cause to an

almost meaningless concept

.^'''''

An employer's subjective and honest belief that the
employee committed an improper act does not itself amount
to good cause.

first,

The "good cause" for discharge means that,

the employer must show that the employee committed

an act which warrants his discharge and,

employer must have

a

at 194.

^^'id.

at 196.

'^^Id.

at 197.

the

reasonable ground for his decision to

terminate the employee in good faith.
^^^Id.

then second,

Thus,

if the

.
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employer cannot prove the employee engaged in alleged

misconduct which constitutes cause for discharge, even
though the employer possessed

a

subjective belief, he does

not have just cause for terminating the employee.
The second component of the objective standard is also

important.

The employer must not only have actual cause

for discharge but must act in good faith.

ponent implies two principles.
cause exists,

First,

'^^^

This com-

even where actual

the employer cannot use the actual cause as a

pretext for an unlawful discriminatory action or arbitrary
discharge.

Second,

the employer must act fairly in

deciding whether discharge is an appropriate and reasonable

discipline
Incidentally,

in order to avoid the courts'

seen in cases applying the subjective test,
is meaningful.

struggles

advance notice

The issue of whether the employer must

prove that the employee actually committed the alleged

misconduct would be solved by advance notice to the
employee, because such a notice will let him know that he
is subject to som.e discipline and will also give him an

opportunity to prove that he has not actually committed the
alleged wrongdoing subject to discipline.

B.

Procedural Fairness

'''id.

.
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The remainder of this article will outline the

following considerations which drafters of

a

federal unjust

dismissal statute should take into account.
1.

Dispute Procedures

Whether

a

wrongful dismissal statute should send

claims directly to the regular courts, to an administrative
agency,

or to arbitration raises procedural fairness

questions.

Arbitration of unjust discharges shoud be

recommended because that method of resolution combines
speed,

economy,

and informality.

A complaint procedure should be designed to minimize
legalistic formality and to resolve cases with finality at
the earliest possible stage.

Effective procedures are

essential to the success of any system seeking to provide
comprehensive,

speedy,

wrongful discharge.

and less costly protection against

In that sense,

mediation-arbitration

procedures should be given high priority in any wrongful
dismissal legislation.

•^'^^

Under the proposed bills, parties are generally

encouraged to resolve their disputes via binding
arbitration.

'''°

The Montana Act also encourages resort to

Michigan Bill of 1982 recommends this model.
^^°The proposed unjust dismissal bills in several
Some recommend
states typically rely on arbitration.
mediation-arbitration procedures. E.g., Michigan, 1982 [HB
5892]; and Pennsylvani, 1981 [HB 1742] (15 days advance
notice of reasons for discharge required; then mediation,
followed by binding and final arbitration)
'^'^^The
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arbitration,

though arbitration is an option that the

parties can establish if they so agree.

'^^^

arbitration clause of the Montana Act, if
filed,

Under the unique
a

complaint is

either party may request the commencing of arbitra-

tion within sixty

days."^^^

Where the other party rejects

the request to arbitrate and loses the lawsuit,

that party

will be liable for the other party's attorney fees incurred

subsequent to the date of the
is accepted,

offer.'^^'^

Where

a

valid offer

arbitration is the exclusive remedy for the

wrongful discharge dispute, thus the arbitrator's award is
final and binding.

-^^^

Proponents of legislation recommending arbitration

procedures confront

a

number of issues, however.

Most of

the proposals for statutory arbitration of wrongful

discharge claims regard the relative finality of awards as
one of the most attractive features of the arbitration

model, which seeks to limit the grounds for judicial review.

Presumably arbitrators would at least attempt to follow the
guidance of the courts.

But in the statutory wrongful

discharge setting, there may be some arbitrators who give
their own interpretation to a statutory term such as "good

cause" or "good faith."

utilized and to be

Code
^'^ont. Code
^^^ont. Code
^^^Mont. Code
^'^Mont.

a

In order for arbitration to be

forum which produces

Ann. §39-2-914.
Ann. §39-2-914(3).
Ann. §39-2-914(4).
Ann. §39-2-914(6).

a

decision of
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high quality, the existence of arbitrators with experience and expertise is as important as the construction of
the workable system.
In an attempt to make the system fair,

appropriate,

effective,

and

it would seem desirable to set a preliminary

mediation stage of minimum duration before
to the final arbitration. "^^^

a

case could go

The initial time spent with

the employer and the mediator-arbitrator,

understanding the

facts and circumstances, would control the arbitrator's

exercise of discretion, which sometimes may be troublesome
and may produce

a

compromise.

After mediation is exhausted, the employee would be
allowed to pursue the claim to final and binding arbitraThe facts revealed during the initial mediation

tion.

stage would narrow the issues for arbitration.

The

mediation-arbitration procedure is attractive because it
avoids those problems with judicial alternatives and covers
a

2.

number of implicit disadvantages in statutory arbitration.

Remedies
Proposals for unjust dismissal legislation will face

the problem of providing a suitable remedy for wrongful

discharge.

Under the various exceptions to the at-will

rule developed in state courts, wrongfully discharged

35

^inda

&

Raab,

supra note 10,

at 1194-96
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employees have been permitted only money damages. ^^^

Under the rule at common law, monetary relief given in the
form of a money judgment has been considered an adequate

remedy for those found to be wrongfully discharged.

a.

Reinstatement
There has been an almost recognized bar to the

exercise of

a

court's equitable powers in wrongful dis-

charge cases.

Unlike monetary remedies, equitable relief

in the form of reinstatement or injunction against dis-

charge has been imposed by only
On the other hand,
a

a

few common law courts.

reinstatement with back pay constitutes

major sanction for enforcement of the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA)

.

In deciding cases under the various

discrimination laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964

(Title VII),

Employment Act

(ADEA),'^^^

^^"^

and the Age Discrimination and

courts have not been reluctant to

order reinstatement.
The reluctance of courts to order reinstatement under
the common law seems to stem from various reasons.
a

general recognition that as

relief or reinstatement,

a

First,

prerequisite for equitable

relief at law,

i.e., money damages,

can range from a small award of back pay to
punitive and compensatory damage awards when liability is
premised on a tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy or the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
~^°^Remedies

^"42 U.S.C.A.
^^^29

§2000 et seq.
U.S.C.A. §621 et seq.
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must be inadequate to compensate for the actual injury.
Courts have recognized that relief at law in the form of

a

money judgment is an adequate remedy for wrongful discharge
in most of the cases.

the denial of reinstatement as a remedy rests

Second,

on the general objection to ordering specific performance
of contracts requiring judicial supervision.

reasoning

would be

a

-^^^

The court's

rather exaggerated analogy that it

would be impractical, if not impossible,

for a court to

provide the continual supervision necessary for specific
enforcement of personal service contracts.
orders reinstatement,

Where the court

it would need to intervene only in

the event the employee subsequently complained of discharge
or unfair treatment in the workplace

The common law

.^^°

tradition of avoiding remedies that need for judicial

supervision should be eroded.
Third, perhaps as the strongest objection to the

remedy of reinstatement, some commentators criticize the
proposal recommending reinstatement based on the problem of
forced association.

ment may be

a

Professor West states that reinstate-

harsh consequence for both employers and

employees when they find the workplace

a

hostile

common law it was recognized that a person cannot,
by decree of court, be compelled to retain another in his
service" (Xurie v. Evangelical Hospital Association, 89 111.
'^''^"At

App.3d 45, 411 N.E.2d 326 (1980)).
'^^^Holloway & Leech, supra note

81,

at 417.

.
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environment after the resolution of their dispute. ^^^
Some courts also state that,

since personal service

contracts often require

a

trust in the workplace,

reinstatement is not appropriate .'^^^

cooperative relationship and

Like the problem of judicial supervision, the forced

association argument is also exaggerated.

"^^"^

Any request

for reinstatement should not be summarily dismissed as

unworkable, but should be examined according to the

particular case's facts and circumstances.
precise,

To be more

the possibility and appropriateness of the

reinstatement order should be examined,
the context of the group's size,

for instance,

in

the nature of the employ-

ee's job, and the nature of the working relationships among
the colleagues and with the superiors.

All of the above grounds for the courts' avoiding

reinstatement as

a

remedy should not loom as obstacles to

reinstatement, nor should lack of

a

statutory mandate

preclude courts from ordering reinstatement as an
alternative.

^^^West,

Absent the presence of

a

duty imposed by

The Case Against Reinstatemnet in Wrongful

Discharge, 1988 III. L. Rev. 1. (according to the reserch,
anywhere from a third to a half of employees offered
reinstatement under National Labor Relations Board orders
decline to return to the privious employer)
^^^E.g.^ Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiologists^ Ltd., 73

Ill.App.3d 901, 905 (1979).
^^'^"No reason for precluding reinstatement out of an
exaggerated regard for the employee's psychic well-being,"
St. Antoine, supra note 250, at 79.
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it would be unlikely for courts to

statute, however,

order reinstatement as

today's common law.

a

remedy even if appropriate in

Thus,

it is recommended that the

legislature require reinstatement of
ee.

'^^'^

a

terminated employ-

Moreover, justifications for equitable relief in the

form of reinstatement must be meaningful,

in particular,

during the severe job market conditions that make reemployment in similar work and pay unlikely.

b.

The Statutory Remedy of Reinstatement

Any unjust dismissal legislation should offer suitable
and flexible remedies for wrongful discharge including

reinstatement when appropriate.

The proposed

bills'^^'''

and

recognize, however, that there are certain areas
of the law where the legislature has required reinstatement
of an employee by a private employer, e.g., when an employee is discriminated against becasue of race, color, creed
^^''"We

supra note 250, at 79.
^^'The California Bill of 1988 [SB 1988] (the arbitrator
may award, among other things, reinstatement, back pay, and
attorney fees); the Michigan Bill of 1982 [HB 5892] (the
arbitrator may award reinstatement with or without back pay
or sex." Antoine,

or severance pay)

;

the Pennsylvania Bill of 1981

[HB

1742] (the arbitrator may reinstate the employee with no,
partial, or full back pay, or award a severance payment

and the Washington Bill of 1987 [HB
with no reinstatement)
1133] (arbitration award may include compensation for all
economic loss, reinstatement, and up to 3 years of future
No punitive damages provided).
lost wages.
;

.
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the Model Act^^^ containing a just cause firing re-

quirement frequently allow reinstatement in non-union
settings

Under the Model Act,

for example,

an arbitrator may

make one or more of the following remedies for wrongful

discharge violating the Act:

reinstatement to the position of
employment the employee held when
employment was terminated or, if that
is impractical, to a comparable
position;
(2) full or partial backpay and reimbursement for lost fringe benefits,
with interest, reduced by interim
earnings from employment elsewhere,
benefits received, and amounts that
could have been received with
reasonable diligence;
(3) if reinstatement is not awarded, a
lump-sum severance payment at the
employee' s rate of pay in effect
before the termination, for a period
not exceeding [36 months] after the
date of the award, together with the
value of fringe benefits lost during
that period, reduced by likely
earnings and benefits from employment
elsewhere, and taking into account
such equitable considerations as the
employee's length of service with the
employer and the reasons for the
termination; and
(1)

366

The Model Act Sec.

7(b) (l)-(4
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(4)

reasonable attorney's fees and

costs.

^^"^

Reinstatement is the preferred remedy for terminations
in violation of this Act.

Reinstatement as

remedy for

a

wrongful discharge, indeed, raises the difficult question
of whether it is appropriate and effective in the nonunion-

ized sector.
issue.

American experts appear to be divided on this

What is important, however,

dismissal statute offer

a

is that an unjust

range of remedies,

reinstatement and back pay with interest for

including
a

fixed period,

If reinstatement is not feasible because of the worsened

relations between the parties which would adversely

influence efficiency in the workplace and the safety of
others,

severance pay may be awarded instead.

'''id.
368

The Model Act Sec. 7(b)

(3;

"^^^

.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Today,

job security is for many American citizens one

of their most valued rights and important expectations.

provides

a

employers.

It

multitude of benefits to both employees and
Job security provides employees with economic

stability and self-esteem, while it provides employers with
improved morale, productivity, lower labor turnover, and
expertise.

Employers should owe their employees

treat them with fundamental fairness,

a

duty to

Limiitation of the

employment at will doctrine requires only fundamental
fairness.

It does not make employers keep unproductive

employees

Common law exceptions to the at will employment, based
the implied-in-f act covenant,

on public policy,

im.plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

and the

have been

significant restraints on the wrongful exercise of an
employer's powers.

Judicial recognition of such exceptions

in one state continued to break paths for decisions in

other states. ^^^

These common-law exceptions, however, do

not amount to protection of all employees'

rights in the

state of Montana furthered its recognition to
the good-cause legislation.
^""The
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workplace.

They also leave employees and employers

unsure of the legality of personnel action in the workplace.
Total abolition of at-will employment by unjust-

dismissal legislation will ultimately be necessary for all
employees to be fully and effectively protected against

wrongful discharge.

It will also reduce the uncertainty

and expense inherent in common law wrongful dismissal suits.
For as "wrongful discharge" protection for all employees in

the country becomes more of a reality,

the enactment of

federal legislation of this kind is inevitable.

FOR

Lli::.^.

di

